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INTRODUCTION
INTERESTED PARTIES AND POLITICS
On June 15, 1929* President Herbert Hoover signed the
Agricultural Marketing Act into law bringing to a close
eight years of intensive work by many people interested in
the farm problem.

Thus, the President had redeemed a

campaign pledge to call a special session of Congress and
secure a far-reaching piece of farm legislation.

The course

of agricultural relief, from its origin in the farm depression
to the enaction of the new law, was influenced by practical
politicians, professional farm representatives, and economic
theorists.

Each group had an impact on the final solution.

The fact that the problem existed and the urgency of
the problem was generally recognized in 192 8.

Alfred E.

Smith, the Democratic nominee for President, noted that
between 1921 and 1927, the value of industry had increased
by fifty-six per cent, while the value of agriculture had
decreased by thirty-six per cent.

Furthermore, the operating
p
costs of the farmer had increased by sixty-two per cent.

Most Republican leaders agreed that the farmer had

^New York Times, June 15 , 192 8.
\

2
problems.

2

Most observers agreed that since the post-war

deflation of '1920-1921, the American farmer had been in
serious trouble.

The price received for his crops had

dropped drastically, but the price of goods and services he
used had remained the same or increased.

The chief causes

of the farm distress seem to have been overproduction, the
inflation-deflation cycle of World War I , and the generally
3
rising cost of living.
In an attempt to develop the
countervailing power to help him deal with his problems,

the

farmer, as had many other groups, organized agricultural
associations.

There were three main types of farm groups:

political pressure organizations, marketing cooperatives,
and general associations.
The most important general associations were the Farm
Bureau, the Farmers’ Union, and the Grange.

The oldest of

these was the National Grange, which was founded by Oliver
Hudson Kelly in 1867.^

By the 1920’s its official doctrine

2

lb i d ., June 11, 1928.
It was interesting to note that
several Republicans were skeptical.
Dr. Hubert Work, who
became Hoover's campaign manager, said that he did not believe
that the farmer was really in trouble.
(New York Times,
July 4, 1928) Senator George Moses of New“Tfampshire agreed,
adding that the sale of lumber and farm implements was up in
the farming regions.
(New York T iiries , August 22 , 19 28.)
3
George F. Warren and F. A. Pearson, The Agricultural
Situation:
the Economics of Fluctuating Prices (New York:
J. Wiley and Sons, 19 2 4X7 pp. 19-21~and 87.
For further
background information on the general situation see Murray
Reed Benedict, Farm Policies of the U . S . , 1790-1950 (New
York:
Twentieth” Century Fund, 195SJi
~~
^Solon Justus Buck, The Granger Movement; a Study of
Agricultural Organization and Its Po1itical, Economic,and
Social Manifestations:
1870-1880
(CambrTclge: Harvard
University Press, 1933), p. 53.
'

3
stressed the need for the farmer to help himself and not rely
5
on the government for assistance.
This position made the
Grange the most conservative of the major groups.

The Grand

Master of the National Grange, L. J. Taber, in his testimony
at the Senate hearings, said that the Grange was active in
thirty-three states through eight thousand subordinate
branches, comprising 800,000 members.^

Taber, in a speech

given during the special session of Congress, stated that the
Grange supported the export debenture program, and proposed
revisions of the tariff laws which would be favorable to the
farmer.^
The newest and largest of the three farm organizations
was the American Farm Bureau Federation.

It was founded in

1919 as an attempt to recruit all farmers into a super-organi
zation, and received the s u p p o r t b o t h organizationally and
financially of the business community and government.

The

founders hoped to create a less radical, better organized
g
group to help stabilize the farm situation.
In the m i d 
twenties, the Farm Bureau’s support of the McNary-Haugen Bill

^New York Times, April 20, and June 1 7 , 1 9 28.
fi
U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry, Farm Relief Legislation, 71st Congress, 1st Session,
1929, p. 510. Hereafter cited as Senate, Farm Relief.
^New York Times, June 17 , 1929 .
8
Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Twentieth Century
Populism (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1951),
p. 255. Hereafter cited as Saloutos and Hicks, Populis m .
A good history of the Farm Bureau Federation is outlined' in
Chapter IV of this book.
\
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caused a partial separation from the non-farm interests which
had been important early in its development.

The Farm Bureau

continued its support of the equalization fee idea through the
campaign of 1928 and into the Special Session of 1929.

9

At

this time, Sam H. Thompson, President of the American Farm
Bureau Federation, told the Senate Committee on Agriculture
that his organization was active in forty-two states and had a
million members, who were engaged in all types of farming.^
The smallest of the three general organizations, consi
dered by most people to be the most radical, was the Farmers’
Educational and Cooperative Union.

It had been founded in

1902 by Isaac Newton Greshem, and became known for its
aggressive policies.

11

The Farmers' Union was undergoing

a tremendous internal struggle in 1928-29.

One faction

within the Farmers' Union believed that the farmer could
only help himself through cooperatives, while the other
maintained that government help in securing "cost of produc
tion" price was essential.

The latter group apparently held

the majority position, but the organization as a whole
played a relatively unimportant roll in charting the course

New York Times, June 8, 9, 10, 1928; Senate, Farm
Relief, pp. 28-37; and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on
Agriculture, Hearings on Agricultural Relief, 71st Congress,
1st Session, 19 29, pp. 7-27. Hereafter "cited as House,
Hearings.
^^Senate, Farm Relief p. 28.
11

r

Soloutos and Hicks, Populism, p. 217.
The history
of the Farmers' Union is covered in Chapter VIII of this book.

5

12
of the proposed farm relief.'

Many of the Union’s officials

spoke out on a personal basis, but none represented the group.
The general farm organizations had official policies of
noninvolvement in partisan-politics, but each maintained e x 
tensive lobbying services which ultimately helped shape the
outcome of the farm relief effort.

There were, however., other

groups whose major purpose was clearly political pressure.
They were usually organized within geographic areas or around
specific crops.

Foremost among these were the Corn Belt Federa

tion and its political action arm, the Committee of Twentytwo.

Whatever the specific goals of the pressure group, they

were to be reached through nonpartisan political activity.

13

The Corn Belt Committee or Corn Belt Federation was
typical and perhaps the most successful of this type of group.
It was formed in 1925 specifically to lobby for the McNaryHaugen proposal then in C o n g r e s s . B y

1928 the Federation

was made-up of thirty-two farm organizations in fourteen
midwestern states, with a combined total membership of over
one million.

15

The national political conventions of 1928

provided a convenient springboard for the Federation, which
made full use of it.

National attention was focused on the

farm problem as the Federation announced its positions on

^ Ibid♦,

p . 238.

^ New York Times, September 1 , 192 8.
^ S aloutos and Hicks, Populism, pp.- 385-6.
^^New York Times, September 1, 1928.

6
the various.candidates and platform proposals of both
political par t i e s . ^
In 1926 the Corn Belt Federation formed a separate organi
zation, the Committee of Twenty-two, presumably as an action
17
group for the Federation. ■

The new group was headed by

George N. Peck, a well known farm lobbyist, and was made up of
two delegates from each of eleven midwestern states.

18

Peek

and his committee were very active in the campaign of 1928.
Political pressure tactics and lobbying were restricted
to the first two types of farm associations, however.

The

third type of organization did not maintain any employees
for legislative activities at the national level, and seldom
at the state level.

If a specific legislative proposal

effected one of the groups, it might send an officer or an
executive secretary to testify at a hearing, but that was
the extent of their national lobbying.
The third major type of farm organization was the
marketing association.

There were more than twelve thousand

cooperatives in operation in the United States in 1929, and
nearly every commodity had one or more marketing association.

19

~^New York Times, June 1, 1928.
17

Saloutos and Hicks, Populism, p. 389.

18

The eleven States were Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin.
N ew York Times, July 29, 1928.
See also
Gilbert Courtlan<T~Fite, George N . Peek and the Fight for Farm
Parity
(Norman: University oT~ Oklahoma Press, 19 54).
19

Lincoln Star (Lincoln, Nebraska) March 13, 19 29.
'\

7
As a group, however, they were not politically effective
during this period because of the diversity of interests
they represented, and their lack of political orientation.
Despite the fact that many farmers belonged to one or
more .of these associations, by far the most important groups
interested in farm relief were the two political parties.
The agriculture question became central to the campaign of
1928 when both political parties declared it to be the most
important issue.

20

Promises were made and new alliances

were formed during the campaign which would change the course
of farm relief legislation.

The political importance of the

issue came into sharp focus in the national conventions of
1928.

The Republicans met first.

The events before and

during that convention thrust the farm issue into the
prominent position which it was to hold until the election.
The action which caused the spotlight to fall on the
farmer was President Coolidge’s veto of the McNary-Haugen Bill
in mid-May.

Farm leaders were so outraged at this betrayal

by the President that all agreed when Adam McMullen, the
Governor of Nebraska, called for an army of farmers to go
to the convention in Kansas City and make their feelings
known to the Republican leaders.

21

Coolidge had added insult

to the veto by his harsh condemnation of the central ideas

^ G i l b e r t Courtland Fite, "The Agricultural Issue in the
Presidential Campaign of 1928n . The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XXXVII (March, 1951), p. 653.
^ N e w York Times, May 24 , 192 8.
\

8

of tlie bi 11.

The Mew' York Times considered the vio 1 enee o£

his message' out of character for the '’cool” Coolidge, and
speculated that he might have been politically motivated.

22

Reaction to the veto crystalized around Governor McMullen
when he passionately evoked the farmers to "arise as crusaders
of old
strong.

. , .
23

and go to the convention one hundred thousand

McMullen's farm crusade and its activities in

Kansas City received national publicity and created a climate
which insured that farm relief was to be the major topic at
the convention.
Much of the pre-convention publicity focused on the farm
groups and their march on Kansas City.

Time reported that

there were overtones of Coxey's Army in the vision of the
Governor.

24

McMullen quickly responded that he wanted the

farmers to meet in Kansas City and not march through the
countryside like a "circus parade".

Soon after that

statement, the Nebraska governor withdrew entirely from
leadership of the farmers f march and was replaced by
Governor A. G. Sorlie of North Dakota.

25

The new leader

called for caravans to be made up of new cars, arid for the
farmers to look prosperous.

He said, "We are going down there

22Ibid., May 24, 25, and 27, 1928.
23Ibid., May 24, 1928.
"Fee, Fie, Foe, Farmers", T i m e , June 4, 1928, p. 10.
New York Times, June 5, and June 8, 1928.

\

9
to demand justice for agriculture.
a tattered mob, pleading for bread.”

This isn’t going to be
26

Leaders of the farmers 1 march were confident upon the
eve of the convention.

Mark Woods, of Lincoln, Nebraska,

predicted that one hundred-thousand "orderly but determined”
27
farmers would arrive at. the eon.ven t ion .

The Chamber of

Commerce of Kansas City reported that it had arranged for
five thousand rooms in private homes and for camping in
public parks, if that became necessary.

28

If huge numbers

of farmers had, in fact, ever planned to attend the convention,
they must have changed their minds.

Time reported that the

center for the farmers'march had only fifteen cars parked
near it and had registered only one hundred farmers after
29
the first day of the convention."

There were undoubtedly

more farmers and farmer representatives than that at the
convention, but the actual number must have created a great
deal of embarrassment for those who predicted one hundred
thousand crusaders.

Those who did go to Kansas City made

their presence felt by marching on the convention, lobbying
individual delegates, testifying before the platform committee,
and presenting a minority farm platform to the convention.

26Ibid., June 8, 192 8.
27Ibid., June 9 , 1928 .
28Ibid■, June 10, 1928.
29

"Farmers:
1928, p. 15.

Politics v. Economics,”

Time, June 25,

10
All of these activities were coordinated by the Committee for
30
that purpose."
Before the convention was under way, the nomination of
Herbert Hoover was a certainty, so the farmers spent most of
their time trying to influence the platform.

They believed

that a Republican President could not ignore their program
if it was incorporated in official party policy.

There

were three groups interested in the agricultural sections of
the platform.

The administration’s workers wanted the document

to support the Coolidge veto of the McNary-Haugen Act, and
little more.

31

The Hoover supporters were anxious to have

a platform that would hold the farming areas and still be
comfortable for their candidate.

32

The farm pressure groups

were working for a platform which would pledge as much as
possible for the farmer, including the equalization fee
sections of the McNary-Haugen Act.

33

The first two groups

were not in conflict and were certainly sympathetic to one
another, so, in the end, the administration supporters and
the Hoover forces wrote the 1928 Republican platform.
i

34

^ New York Times, June 3, 10, 14, 1928.'
^ O . G . Villard, "The Elephant Performs at K.C.,,f
Nat ion, June 27 , 1928 , p. 711.
32 Evening State Journal (Lincoln, Nebraska), June 8,
and 9 , I9T8^ [TTereaf ter cited as State Journa 1) and New York
T imes, June 10 , 192 8.
^ nRes Publicae,” Time, May 28, 1928, p. 9.
34

State Journal, June 1, 192 8.

11
The campaign document took up the farm problem under two
headings:

agriculture and tariff.

The latter section re

affirmed the principle of protection and discussed the im
portance of the tariff to general prosperity.

A generally

high standard of living in the United States was the greatest
aid lo the farmer, and therefore, a continuation and extension
of the existing policy would be in his best interest.

The

agricultural section briefly recognized the farm problem,
outlined the previous Republican aid to the farmer, and
proposed to put farming on an equal basis with industry by
affording greater tariff protection and reorganizing the
market system.

The new marketing system was to be organized

through cooperatives and stabilization corporations, directed
36
by a federal farm board and financed by the federal government,‘
The passage of this platform, which contained little the farm
spokesman had advocated, caused the collapse of the farm
crusade.

Its principle candidate for the Presidency, William

Lowden, ex-governor of Illinois, withdrew his name from
consideration, and the disorganized farm groups had little
impact on the nomination.
Contemporary analysis of the Republican Convention was
varied.

Some observers like Senator McNary of Oregon pre-

35

Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, National
Partv Platforms 1840-1960 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1961J , pp. 282-283.
56Ibid., 285-286 .

dieted that the American farmer would support. Hoover on
election day. 37

Others were certain that the farmer would

once again support a third party movement,

38

Some observers

predicted a switch to the Democratic party by the agricultural
Midwest.

In fact, the National Chairman of the Democratic

Party invited the farm leaders to the Democratic convention
and promised them better treatment than they had received
3Q
from the Republicans.
.

The farmer indeed found himself in a very advantageous
position during the Democratic National Convention of 1928.
Time characterized the meeting as being divided into two
groups:

".

. . lean hungry Senators and Representatives

from the South and West

. . . and . . . jovial, well-fed

city bosses from the North and East.”

40

The Convention was

badly split over the issues of religion, machine politics,
prohibition, and the nomination of Smith.

The city bosses

of the party were agreed on a candidate, and they held the
power to control the convention.^

These hard-headed politicians

knew that they needed support from outside their own areas,,
so they made every effort to build strength in the Midwest.

37New York Times, June 17, 1928.
38Ibid., June 9, 10, 1928.
30Ibid., June 14, 1928.
"National Affairs:
25, 1 9 2 8 , p . 8.

The Democracy,"

T i m e , June

13
Their appeal started with the invitation extended by the
National Chairman to the farm representatives.

It continued

when the keynote speaker, Claude G. Bowers, demanded that,
”. . .

the hand of privilege be taken out of the farmers'

pocket and off of the farmers' throat."

42

Every effort was

made to put the spotlight on the farm issue and take it off
of the problem issues of prohibition, religion, and machine
politics.

43

These issues, however, were of primary importance

throughout the election period.

Few other issues were as

I
■
Despite the intended use of;the farm issue as
{
1
a red herring, leaders of all agricultural organizations went
important.

44

to the convention with a great deal of optimism, and they
1
apparently were able to influence the character of the
I
/
1
Many delegates had called for a strokg agricultural
I
plank to split the Republican power in the Midwest.
RepreDemocratic platform.

45

sentative Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, ajbked for adoption

|

of the McNary-Haugen principle, while Senator Pat Harrison
(
^ New York Times, June 23, 1928.

j

4 3Ti •j
!
Ibid.
j
44
f
The best coverage of the Democratic convention and
the issues before it is to be found in the Nation. See the
following articles : James Cannon Jr., "Ajl Smi th--Cathol ic ,
Tammany, Wet," Nation, July.4 , 1928 , pp. 19-10; L.S. Gonnett,
"Big Show at Houston," Nation, July 11, 11928 , pp. 34-5; L. S.
Gonnett, "It's all A1 Smith," Nation, Jully
I 4, 1928 , p. 8.
New York Times, June 11, 23, 24, ajnd 25, 1928.

Vi
i
c
*
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of Missouri called for a plank that would pledge strong and
A
quick action. ' One of the most interesting pleas came from
James.W, Gerard, Treasurer of the Democratic National Com
mittee.

He noted that the party had been defeated on the

tariff issue many times and concluded that the Democratic
Party should recognize the popular support and not oppose
the protection program.

He argued that the benefits of the

tariff which had been unequally distributed, should be extended
to the farmer. 47

Support from the delegates, combined with

farm lobbying had an impact on the Democratic Resolutions
Committee.

The program presented to that committee was the

same as had been advocated at the Republican convention.

48

Ideas of the agricultural representatives were adopted
almost completely, which caused the Evening- State Journal to
comment that the platform ” . . .promised agriculture nearly
everything a democratic convention could offer without
endorsing a republican bill."

49

The fan®, plank was one of

the longest of the entire platform and included an indictment
of the Republican farm policy.

It charged): that the Repub

licans had supported only the reduction off output as a remedy
which would force millions of farmers int® the already
crowded cities.

One of the sections seeisasdR to call for a

46lb i d ., June 22, and 24 , 1928.
47Ibid., June 22 , 1928.
4h b i d . , June 24, 1928 , and June 2&A. 1928.
State’ Journal, June .29 , 192 8.

15
*
program designed to extend tariff equalization to the
farmers., but was not specific about how this was to be
accomplished and was inserted most unobtrusively.

50

The

platform further called for ending special privilege in
tariff matters, developing cooperatives, and reorganizing
the marketing system.

The farm plank stated that any program

must include four things:

credit aid to cooperatives, reduc

tion of the difference between farm price and consumer price,
consideration of the farmer in new tax laws, and a new farm
policy under the direction of a federal farm board analogous
to the Federal Reserve B o a r d . ^
The agricultural plank was well received by organizations
and political leaders alike.

Senator Harrison of Mississippi,

called it a ’’forward declaration” which would add some traditionally Republican states to the Smith column.

52

Senator,

Carraway of Arkansas characterized the plank as a recognition
of the McNary-Haugen principle which would insure Democratic
success in the fall.

53

Governor McMullen gave the platform

his whole-hearted approval, commenting that the farm organi
zations should approve because it endorsed the McNaryHaugen principle.

McMullen, however, refused to endorse

50
The American Farm Bureau was to charge later in the
campaign that many rural newspapers printed the Democratic
platform without this section. An investigation was promised,
but no results were published.
New York T i mes, July 7, 1928.
^ Porter, Platforms, pp. 2 72-3.
^ N e w York Times, June 29 , 1928.
53

Ibid.

\
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SA
Smith - and said that he preferred to "wait and see".“ '

Farm

organization leaders also announced their approval of the
Democratic platform.

George Peek

and Sam H. Thompson

gave

statements indicating great support for the farm plank.
They also refused to support Smith directly, but at the same
time, left no question of Iheir preference for the Democratic
nominee.55
Comments about the Democratic Convention were mixed.
George Peek expressed confidence that the strong farm plank
would overcome Midwestern reluctance for the "wet” Catholic
son of the Tammany Tiger. ^

More conservative observers

like Governor Christiansen of Minnesota said that there was
little or no likelihood that the traditionally Republican
farmers of his state would bolt the party for Smith.

57

The

most realistic and honest observers like L.S. Gonnett of the
Nation very candidly said that the real issues of the election
were prohibition, Catholicism, and Smith’s ties to big city
machine politics. 58

These issues were not likely to produce

a trend against Hoover in the farm states.

54Ibid., June 30, and July 3, 1928.
"’h b i d . , June 28 , 29, 30 , and
July 3, 1928.
0 ’Neill of- the Farm Bureau and Gray Silver ofthe
Union, also endorsed Smith in this period.

Edgar
Farmers’

56Ibid., June 23, 1928.
57Ibid., July 7, 1928.
ro

L.S. Gonnett, "Big Show at HoUsrton, ”
July 11, 1928, pp. 34-5.
h

Nation,

17
Following the convent ions, the Midwest was commonly
character!zed as being in open revolt against Hoover.

The

Republican party would apparently be forced to spend time
and money in this region as never before h'53

However, by

late July the ’’corn belt revolt" was pronounced "disMpated".,
and the manager of the Hoover campaign in the West, James W.
Good, announced that he thought the Midwest would remain
Republican, "with a minimum of difficulty

Senator

Brookhart went further and announced that the region presented
no contest for the Republicans.

61

Only the most die-hard of

the Smith Supporters continued to hold any public hope of a
real break betiveen the grain farmers and the Republican party.
The Hoover strategy was calculated to take advantage of
the traditional Republicanism of the Midwrestern farmer.

The

campaign text pointed out that control in Congress had been
in the hands of agricultural representatives and that the
interest of the farmer.1.'had been well served.

62

The virtue

of party regularity was preached, publicly and privately, and
had its impact on the politicians of the region.

Very few

Republican governors, senators, or representatives, ultimately
refused to support Hoover, despite their previous opposition

qQ

lb id., July 29, 1928.
The New York Times editorially
suggested that the best place for the Republicans to spend
their campaign funds would be on the Grain Exchange in
Chicago.
New York Times , August 10 , 1928.
^ lb id., September 1 , 1928.
^ Ibid., September 6 , 1928.
^ I b id. , September 4, 1928.

\
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to his nomination.

One of the first politicians to announce

his support of the party nominee was Senator McNary. of Oregon,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture..

McNary said/

soon after the convention, that he had met with Hoover finding
the Secretary of Commerce sympathetic and anxious to help the
farmer.

The Senator believed that the platform program would

certainly help the agricultural situation by forming a base
for further.Congressional a c t i o n . ^

Reconciliation between a

Senator closely tied to farm relief programs and nominee
Hoover,under-scored the vital nature of political regularity
and served as a pattern to be followed by many other figures
who had violently opposed the nomination of the Secretary of
Commerce.

Most of the political leaders of the Midwest

finally came into the fold and either supported Hoover or
made no effort against him.

Perhaps the most notabTer' of the

anti-Hoover group who returned to support the ticket were
Senator Smith Brookhart of Iowa,, Senator William Borah of
Idaho, Governor John Hammill of Iowa and Governor McMullen.
In fact, all but the Nebraska governor became strong supporters of the Republican ticket.

64

The force of party

loyalty was so strong that the only major Republican from

^ State Journal, June 16 , 1928.
^ T h e background of the decision of each of these
leaders can be easily traced through the New York Times for
June and July, 1928.
Particular emphasis was placed on
Brookhart and McMullen.
The editorial section had a good
time with the about-face of these two figures.
See the New
York Times, July 4, 19 28, for the Brookhart editorial, and
August 28, 1928, for the McMullen editorial.

19
the .Midwest who actually declared his support for Smith, was
Senator George Norris of Nebraska.

65

The role of politics

in these decisions was critical* but the Republican campaign
efforts must have reassured many of these leaders that
significant progress could be made with Hoover as President.
The Republican campaign followed the farm plank of the
platform exactly.

Hoover emphasized the concept of improved

marketing in his speeches and promised stabilization financed
by the Federal government

and controlled by farm cooperatives.^

The only real deviation from the platform and the general
post-convention strategy was the apparent result of Senator
Norris' announcement that he would support Smith.

Senator

Borah had previously urged Hoover to announce that, early in
his administration, he would call a special session of
Congress to consider farm relief.

Following the defection

of Norris* Hoover announced that he would follow Borah’s
suggestion, provided the upcoming short session did not
deal with the issue satisfactorily.

67

The Republican

campaign for capturing the farm vote was based on emphasizing
the benefits of the traditional ties in the Midwest, the
platform program, and a promise of immediate Congressional
attention to the relief of agriculture.

^ N ew York' Times , October 2 8, -192 8.
^ S e e , for instance, New Yo'r'k' T i m e s , October 7, 1928 ,
for a speech made in Elizabethtown, Tennessee.
^ N e w York Times, October 28 and 29, 1928.
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The Smith campaign, on the other hand, was neither so
well organized, nor so successful.
from the very beginning.

The problem was obvious

The candidate’s support was the

Big-city, industrial vote,but it was not large enough to
carry him to the Presidency without help from other segments
of the electorate.

The most obvious potential allies were

the Midwestern farmers, who were leaning away from Hoover
anyway.

Smith was faced immediately and throughout the

campaign with the problem of appealing to the farmers without
alienating his urban supporters.^

The farm campaign was

characterized: by a certain vagueness and contradiction.
Smith announced his support of the party platform and the
principle of the equalization fee, but not the McNary-Haugen
Bill itself.

69

He triea to clarify this position by saying

that the McNary-Haugen principle was satisfactory, but that
the details of the bill were not.

70

This uncertain distinc

tion brought immediate criticism from Hoover supporters, who
made a standard demand that Smith dispell the ambiguity of
his position and either accept the McNary-Haugen Bill or
reject it.

71

About the only person who accepted Smith’s

remarks as encouraging to the farmer was George Peek, who

^ Ibid., September 20 , 1928.

See also April 9, 1928.

69

Ibid., July 10, August 4, arid September 9 , 1928, and
State Journal, July 10, 1928.
70

71

New York Times, September 1, 1928.
See for instance, New York Times, September 30, 1928.
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announced that the candidate's acceptance of the principle
was entirely satisfactory to him. and that details could be
worked out later.

72

Support of Smith proved to be a typical

response from farm association leaders.
Peek announced his personal support for Smith about
a month after the Democratic Convention, although it had
been apparent since the Republican Convention that his
sentiments were for Smith.

Many other Midwestern agricul

tural leaders also announced their support of the Democratic
candidate.

Sam H. Thompson, Chester C. Davis of the Committee

of Twenty-twro, and William Settle, were among the first to
give their indorsement.

73

In addition, many associations

adopted resolutions favorable to the Democratic ticket.

Most

of the major organizations could not directly name a candidate
because of internal regulations, but most made their political
intentions perfectly clear.

For instance, the annual conven

tion of the Iowa Farmers* Union passed a resolution supporting
the Democratic platform and closed that session by singing

^ New York Times, August 3, 1928.
73
The only two farm organization leaders who announced
support for Hoover were Charles Barrett, President of the
National Farmers* Union, and Ralph Snyder, President of the
Kansas Farm Bureau.
For Barretts announcement, see New York
T imes, July 12 , 1928.
It should be noted that Barrett was
from Georgia which might suggest that factors other than
farm relief might have influenced his decision.
For Snyder's
position see New York Tim e s , August 20, 1928.
It must be
remembered that Kansan was the home state of Charles Curtis,
the Republican vice presidential nominee.

\

2 2,
,!The Sidewalks of New York,"

Smith’s campaign song.
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The actions of the farm organizations led to a split
between the political leaders and the organization leaders
of the Midwest.

The resulting alienation was spotlighted

by a bitter, public fight which broke out between George Peek
and Governor Hammill during the campaign.

These two had been

friends and co-ivorkers in their previous struggle for farm
legislation, but each charged in the press that the other was
unfaithful to his farm constituents.

75

The separation of

these two leadership groups was to have an effect when the
farm relief program moved into Congress.

Apparently, the

split negated the impact of traditional leaders in the
campaign, and every farmer was left to choose for himself.
The Democratic strategy for the Midwest region was based on
the support of the farm association leaders.

Inability to

attract the average farmer without alienating Smith’s base
of support prevented the strategy from being successful.

The

campaign effort was further hampered by the general lack of
a positive program.

Vague promises of aid to the farmer,

coupled with a hazy stand on the symbol of farm relief, the
McNary-Haugen Bill, made the Democratic bid for Midwestern
support a futile effort.

74.
New York Times, September 21, 1928.
Other farm
organizations which made similar commitments were:
The
Missouri Farmer’s Association, The Indiana Farm Bureau
Federation, and The Corn Belt Committee.
New York Times,
July 11, 13, August 15, 17, and 30, 1928.
^ New York Times, July 30, August 6, and 7, 192 8.
\
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The election returns indicate the real hopelessness of
the Democratic campaign.

Hoover received over twenty-one

million popular votes while Smith received only fifteen
million.

Smith carried only eight states in the solid South

which made the electoral vote even more one-sided. 76

This

landslide victory was interpreted by many Republicans as a
mandate for the Hoover program in the areas of the tariff
and agriculture.

77

position, however.

Election analysts do not agree with that
In fact, the negative aspects of the

silent issues of prohibition, Catholicism, and big city politics
seem to have killed Smith’s hopes in the Midwest.

78

Reports

from South Dakota and Nebraska about a month before the
election indicated that the greatest problem the Democratic
candidate faced was his religion.

The dispatch from South

Dakota even said that Smith could sweep the state if he were
only Protestant.

79

The Nebraska report added that Smith's
on

stand on prohibition had hurt his chances to carry that State.
The Grand Island Independent concluded somewhat later, that the
election returns showed "too conclusively" that the central

76
1932

Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote:
1896(Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1934), pp. 24-27.

^ New York Times, November 8, 1928.
78

See Edmund D. Moore, A Catholic Runs for President:
the Campaign o f 19 28 (New York:
TFe Ronald~Press Co~. , 19 56.) ,
ancl New York Times, October 8, 1928.
7Q
New York T i m e s , October 6, 1928.
^ Ibid. , October 4, 1928.
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issues had been religion and prohibition.

81

The issue of big

city machine politics got more attention before the election.
Senator Capper of Kansas remarked that Hoover was from the
West and understood the farmer, while Smith, being from
New York City, could never understand agricultural problems.

82

Secretary of Agriculture Jardine commented that Tammany
representatives in Congress had always voted against farm
relief, and that Smith never carried the agricultural sections
of New York State.

The Secretary concluded that Smith was a

loyal son of Tammany and should not be trusted.

83

The results,

then, probably should not have been taken as a mandate for
H o o v e r ’s policies.
Perhaps the best analysis of the farm vote was written
by Anne O ’Hare McCormick for the New York T i m e s .

She argued

that the farm vote as a unified block did not exist because
the farmer insisted on the right to cast his ballot as a
completely free agent.

84

He had consistantly been guided

by his general opinion more than his special interest, and
had influenced every issue but his own.

85

She concluded that

^ I b i d ., October 4, 1928.
^ I b i d ., October 14 , 1928.
See also New York Times ,
October 14, 1928, for similar remarks by Representative
L. J. Dickenson of Iowa.
^^New York Times, September 2, 1928.
See New York T i m e s ,
August 24, 19 28~ for similar remarks by Joseph L. Bristow,
former Senator from Kansas.
^ I b i d . , October 14 , 1928.

85Ibid., March 31, 1928.
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the

armor voted more from habit than from self-interest and

h.1s trip to the po 11ing place'was 1’mos 11y for the sake
that his
of

a r gguument
r

86
a nyway; e

The reasons for Hoover’s victory in 1928 were not as im
portant as the impact of the campaign and election on the
process 'of farra relief .legislation*

Probably the greatest

result was the elevation of the Hoover program to the head
of the list of various legislative possibilities.

Of

almost equal importance was the binding of Midwestern
political leaders to the Hoover program and the alienation
of the association leaders from the new President.

The

t

political leaders’ support of the Republican ticket made it
very difficult for them to oppose the administration's
program when it was proposed in Congress.

During the course

of the campaign, farm association leaders had formed open
alliances with the Democratic leadership, and the power of
this coalition was entirely free of any control by the
administration.

In fact, it became the greatest obstacle

to the Hoover program.

Finally, the Hoover promise of a

special session opened the doors of Congress to immediate and
exclusive consideration of farm relief legislation.

86I b i d .

CHAPTER II
THE HEARINGS
PROGRAMS
In March of 1929 , the Committees on Agriculture, of
both the House and the Senate, began hearings which were to
mold the needs of the American farmer, the programs of the
farm groups, and the promises of the politicians into proposed legislation.

Virtually the same effort had been made

many times before^ and committee members exhibited a sense of
weariness during the opening sessions.

The chairman of the

Senate committee, Charles McNary of Oregon, instructed the
witnesses that the committee would concede that the farm
problem was -'proverbial" if they would simply explain their
proposed solutions.

2

Representative James Aswell of Louisiana

remarked, on the opening day of the House hearings, that the
Senate hearings had started two days before, and nothing new
had been said.

He suggested that the chairman ask the farm

groups to get together, because the committee did not need to

New York Times, March 25 and 28, 1929. The Senate Com
mittee began hearings on March 25 and the Bouse Committee
began on March 28.
2

U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry, Farm Relief Legislation, 71st Congress, 1st Session,
1929, p. 28. Hereafter cited as Senate, Farm Relief.
26

27
hear the same old arguments again.

Linwood Clark of Maryland

replied that the committee had been requesting that for ten
years.

3

’’The proceedings reminded one,” according to T i m e ,

"of an 1890 melodrama revived and played straight."^
the lack of enthusiasm among the committee members,

Despite
the

prospects of legislation emerging from Congress and being
approved by the President were excellent.

A New York Times

editorial stated that the Republicans had to redeem their
campaign promises while the Democrats wanted to prove that
they were the real friends of the farmers.^
News concurred,

The Omaha Bee-

adding that if no help was forthcoming, the

Republicans would be charged with "cheap and disreputable
politics."^

Charles I. Stengle,

editor of the National Farm

N e w s , testified before the House committee,
sentiment had changed.

Six years before,

that public

there had been no

public support for the farmer, but there was great contemporary
interest which was reflected by intense political pressures.
Editors were not all optimistic, however.

The Lincoln

Star remarked that all the Congressional activity in Washington

3
U.S., Congress, House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings
on Agricultural R e l i e f , 71st Congress, 1st Session 1929, p. 6.
Hereafter cited as Senate, Farm R e l i e f .
4

"National Affairs:
April 8, 1929, p . 10.

Farmers:

Relief, Yet Again", T i m e ,

^New York T i m e s , April 8 , 1929.
^Omaha Bee-News (Morning Edition), June 12, 1929.
7
House, Hearings, p. 675.
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was vital, to the region, hut that the Republican leaders had
forgotten the farmer.**

Every manufacturer in the country

was in Washington for the tariff hearings, according to the
New York Tiiries, but very few farmers appeared.

It concluded

that the farmer had little real interest in the course of
legislation and trusted Hoover to work for him.

9

The

Hast.ings Democrat went further and called the farmer a "help10
less and innocent bystander5’.

Both the optimistic and

pessimistic observers agree, however, that the time was right
for the passage of farm legislation.

Although the result

would not emerge for nearly two months, the legislative
process began with hearings in both committees.
The witnesses who testified reflected the diverse
interests involved.

Farmers, farm organization represen

tatives, political leaders, executive branch spokesmen,
representatives of business organizations, labor leaders,
private citizens, and professional economists were all p r e 
sent to attempt to influence legislation.

There were sixty-

six witnesses before the House Committee, which held nine
sessions between March 27 and April 4 . ^

An equal number

appeared before the Senate Committee which met from March 25

0
Lincoln (Nebraska) Star, March 17, 1929.
May 9, 19 29.
9

See also

'
New York Times, March 31, 19 29.
Tt should be noted
that tariff "Hearings 'were also being held in conjunction
with the Sx^ecial Session.
1o
Hastings (Nebraska) Democrat, May 16, 1929.
11

House, Hearings , pp. 1-870 .

v
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to April 1 2 . ^
The testimony offered'b y .these experts was as divergent
as the group itself.

No one was quite as succinct as I. H.

Hull,, of the Indiana Farm Bureau, who'reported that there
were only two problems:

high costs and low prices.

13

Much

statistical evidence was given to indicate the general plight
14
of the farmer.'
Dudley G. Roe, a Maryland legislator and
wheat farmer, outlined three areas of general agreement among
farmers A

First, there was a farm problem.

Second, the

solution was to get rid of surplus commodities.
problem was caused by the tariff policy.

Third, the

He argued that the

farmer was forced to buy in a protected market, but had to
sell in the world market.

If it was fair to protect the

manufacturer, then it was also fair to protect the farmer by
making the tariff work for agriculture.

15

These arguments

were echoed and re-echoed through both committee rooms during
the entire hearing period.

The rational offered in support of

the simpler solutions was that they would m ake.the tariff
more beneficial to agriculture.

Attacks on the basic assump

tions of the tariff were almost completely absent from the
hearings .

Senate, Farm Relief, pp. Ill-IV.
13

House, Hear m g s , p. 2 38.

14

Senate, Farm Relief, p. 5. For further statistical
evidence see: New York Times, May 31, 1929, and Keith County
(Ogallala, Nebraska) N e w s , March 7, 1929.'
15

House, Hear m g s , pp. 352-357.
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Two programs for making the tariff effective on farm
commodities were presented.

Both were already familiar to

the committee members, as well as the interested public.

One

was the export debenture program; the other was the equali
zation fee idea.

The McNary-Haugen Bills, which .had gained

great popular support in the twenties, were built aruund the
equalization fee.

The bill had been introduced into five

Congresses, passed by two, and vetoed twice.

The plan had

been devised by George N. Peek and Hugh S. Johnson of the
Moline Plow Company.

The Peek-Johnson plan was based on the

assumption that if the surplus crop could be withheld from
the domestic market to be released during slack seasons or
sold on the world market, domestic prices could be maintained
at a higher level.

The cost of the loss incurred by buying

on the home market and selling on the world market was to be
paid by the producers.

16

Under the McNary-Haugen program,

the government was to organize a huge export corporation
which was to trade commodities on the domestic market at a
certain ’’ratio price” .

This was similar to the later parity

price concept and was to be determined by the pre-war value
of the commodities.

The plan would stabilize' the domestic

market at a level satisfactory to the farmer.

When any

commodity was originally sold under the program, the farmer

16

Murray Reed Benedict, Farm Policies of the U.S.,
1790-19 50 (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), pp. 208210.
Hereafter cited as Benedict, Farm Policies.

31
was to receive a certain part of the ratio price in cash and
the rest: in script, which would be redeemed yearly for a
percentage of its face value.

The withheld portion was to

cover the export loss and the administration of the program.

17

The McNary-Haugen program was so familiar to the committee
that no formal prosentation of the plan was m a d e .

Many

witnesses expressed approval or disapproval, and nearly all
were asked to evaluate the plan..
S. H. Thompson, President of the American Farm Bureau
Federation, was one of the stauchest supporters of the
equalization fee.

He said that his testimony was drawn

directly from a policy resolution approved at the last annual
meeting of the Farm Bureau.

He began by stating that, under

present circumstances, an American price for farm commodities
was impossible.

Therefore, an American standard of living

could''not'be enjoyed by farm families.

This situation could

never be improved until the entire crop was placed under the
control of "efficient marketing and distribution."

Thompson

suggested that a combination of the equalization fee and
cooperative marketing associations would be necessary to
solve the farm problem.

18

Chester H. Gray, a lobbyist for

the American Farm Bureau, also appeared before the House
Committee.

He stated that the members of the Farm Bureau had

studied the equalization fee for four years before they

^ Ibid., pp. 212-213.
1&
Senate, Farm Relief, pp. 28-29.
A
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approved it, and they were not going to give it up suddenly.

19

When Gray was asked if he would support the McNary-Haugen bill
without the fee idea, he answered, "No".

When asked if he

would accept the export debenture plan as a substitute for
the fee, again he simply answered, "No".

20

The equalization fee, however, was not universally
supported in the hearings.

Many witnesses passed it by in

favor of other proposals, and some actively opposed it.

S. J.

Cothington, President of the Farmers Grain Dealers Association
of Iowa, and L. 0. Moser, President of the American Cotton
Growers Exchange, flatly4-;, opposed the equalization fee.

C. S.

Ralston, representative of the National Potato Institute,
testified that the fee did nothing for the potato growers,
so they were largely indifferent to the plan.

21

Even the

committee members themselves seemed reluctant to endorse
the fee idea again.

Representative Aswell took one witness

to task for wasting the time of the committee with his
discussion of the fee.

22

He implied that Coolidge’s veto

of the earlier McNary-Haugen Acts had sealed the fate of the
equalization fee.

The ex-President’s vitriolic attack on the

equalization fee must have made more than one committee
member reluctant to try that solution again.

19 House , Hearings, p . 9.
20Ibid., p. 15.
21Ibid., pp. 233-234.
22Ibid., p. 27.

Coolidge and
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his Attorney General had argued the fee was, in fact, a sales
tax.

The taxing power Constitutionally rested with Congress

and could not be shifted to a farm board.
measure was unconstitutional.
that the bill was unsound.

Therefore, the

The ex-President also believed

He reasoned that if the program

raised prices, it would promote a gigantic surplus which
would choke the entire program.
previous administration
new President

23

The total enemity of the

and the supposed opposition of the

seemed to doom the equalization fee to

oblivion.
Another, similar idea, the export debenture plan, was
presented as an alternative to the equalization fee.
Although,the debenture was quite an old idea, it had received
little Congressional attention until the Special Session.
The contemporary form of the debenture program seemed to
be the work of Professor Charles L. Steward of the University
of Illinois.

Under his program, any exporter of an agricul

tural commodity which was protected by a tariff, was to be
issued a debenture credit for each bushel of the commodity
shipped out of the country.

The value of the debenture was

to be a proportion of the tariff.

Any merchant could use

the debenture to pay the duty on any imported item.

24

^JftFee, Fie, Foe, Farmers," Time, June 4 , 1928, pp. 10-11.
24

Benedict, Farm Policies, pp. 226-227. As an example,
the tariff on wheat was forty-two cents per bushel and the
proposed debenture rate was fifty per cent. A wheat exporter
would receive debenture credits amounting to twenty-one cents
per bushel.
Any one could then use the debentures to pay the
tariff on any imported goods.

34
Louis J. Taber, Grand Master of the National Grange ?
appeared before both committees to support the export deben
ture program.

Most of his testimony was in the form of a

5
written report stating the position of the National Grange. 2 J
This paper advocated a four part program, including a system
of cooperative marketing, the export debenture program,
tariff reform, and changes in public land policy.

The Grange

maintained that all four must be put into effect, because
none would be really effective alone.

26

Congress was asked

to alter the land policy by ending all programs which would
expand the amount of farm land.

No more reelama-t'ibiiv£,-.%

colonization, irrigation, or drainage projects were to be
started.

In addition, a program of reforestation was to be

immediately undertaken.

The Grange also agreed with the idea

of expanding the cooperative marketing system which was to
reduce the distribution costs.

The new system was to be

directed by a federal farm board.

The Grange position would

not accept a weak or political board.

The Grange did support

the debenture program, because it would reduce the surplus
without destroying the domestic price.

The experience of

foreign countries had originally interested the Grange in
the debenture system, and the association considered it a
"necessary complement", of the tariff system. 2 7

“^Senate,' Farm Relief, pp. 508-510.
26Ibid., pp. 509-10 .
27Ibid., p. 509.
\
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Taber,
plan.

in his personal testimony,

emphasized the debenture

He reminded the committees that Alexander Hamilton had

endorsed the system as the only way to raise prices on exported
goods.

23

Taber reported a study of the estimated cost of the

debenture program if it had been in effect over the past five
years.

The statistics indicated that the cost would have been

less than one hundred and fifty million dollars per year.
More than half of that total would have been paid to cotton
exporters.

Tobacco, wheat,

and wheat flour dealers would have

'
29
been the next largest recipients. *

Taber believed that the

cost was justified by the aid being given to manufacturers.
In addition,

the rising farm prices would increase the p u r 

chasing power of the farmer, thus aiding the manufacturer
and laborer.

Further,

the income tax would increase,

partially compensating for the initial expense.

30

thereby

Taber

concluded that he was not asking for anything the government
was not already doing.

The farmer was in need of the de ben

ture program in the same way other segments of the economy
needed the tariff.

31

During the questioning session which followed T a b e r ’s
testimony, Senator George Harris of Nebraska stated that

28I b i d . , p . 512.
29

I b i d . , pp. 514-515.
The actual dollar amounts, in
millions per year, were:
cotton 89.4, wheat 20.2, tobacco
15.4, wheat flour 12.0,
3 0 I b id., p. 519.
3 1 I b i d . , p.

522.
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while the equalization fee put the cost oh the farmer, the
debenture program was funded by the treasury.

He rhetorically

asked how anyone could expect a President, who was against
the former, to support the latter.

3?

Representative Aswell -

asked if the Grange would accept a program without the
debenture feature.

Taber replied,

"We are going to continue

to fight for complete equality, but we will accept partial
33
equality, if we are compelled to.”
In stark contrast to the simplicity of the export d e b e n 
ture and the equalization fee, a complex, comprehensive
program was presented by Professor John D. Black of the
department of economics at Harvard University.

He introduced

and explained a written report which he had prepared.

The

professor's work was predicated on the idea that the farm
problem was not a real depression, because it was not cyclical
in nature.

He argued that agriculture had reached a new

phase which was likely to be more or less permanent.

American

production was out of proportion to the population and had to
readjust to this new level or find some artificial scheme to
raise domestic prices.

Black concluded that the only way to

raise domestic prices quickly and appreciably was to use a
combination of tariff readjustment,

the export debenture plan,

and a program called the domestic allotment.
The domestic allotment plan was a program designed to

^ I b i d . , p . 518 .
33

House, Hearings, p. 691.
h
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create an artifical shortage of commodities in the domestic
market.

Under this plan the Department of Agriculture and

the Department of Commerce were to estimate the total demand
for a commodity during the following year.

A mathematical

formula would be used to determine the amount of that crop
which could be sold under the domestic allotment program.
This amount would be slightly smaller than the anticipated
demand.^

A share of this total was then to be alloted to

each farm using a formula which was as mechanical as possible.
An individual farm share would depend on acreage, yield, and
sales for the preceeding five years.

35

The farmer could then

sell up to his share of the commodity in the protected
market.

If a farmer raised more than his allotment allowed

him to sell, he could either purchase additional allotments
from other farmers, or sell his produce on the world market.
Any domestic processor of a commodity covered by the allotment
program must have allotment cert ificates, tariff receipts, or
revenue stamps equal to the amount of the tariff for all of
the crop that he consumed.

36

The domestic allotment program

would create an artificial scarcity on the domestic market
and drive the price of a covered commodity to the world price
plus the tariff.
o f .the program:

34

Black considered the following advantages
no stimulation of overproduction, the

.
Senate, Farm R e l i e f , p. 89.

^ ^Ibid_. , p . 69 .
^ T b i d ., p . 8 5.
"\

allotments themselves were a source of credit and insurance,
the portions of the crop used for feed and seed were unaffected
the program did no harm to foreign farmers, and it was selffinancing,

He considered administrafive p r o b l e m s , increased

cost of living, impossibility of new farmers entering the
field,

and limited applicability as the chief disadvantages.

37

Black believed that the domestic allotment program would
be useful if applied only to wheat and cotton, because they
were the only major crops which were largely exported.

To

raise the prices of other crops, other devices had to be used.
He suggested higher tariff duties on certain products which
were largely imported.

Much study of the effect of substitute

products was essential to make the tariff truly effective.
Black said that the export debenture was needed to aid
certain kinds of products.

It was to be used on commodities

which were mainly consumed in the domestic market, but the
exported portion was determining the market price
whole crop.

of the

Black testified that these three measures taken

together formed the best solution, because each part could
be applied to the commodities which it was best suited to help.
Three of the four major programs presented in the
hearings were to bring tariff equalization to the farmer.

The

fourth, which became closely identified with President Hoover,
emphasized a different aspect of the problem.

^ T b i d . , pp.

80-81.

^ I b i d . p. 66 and p. 70.

It suggested

that orderly marketing was the best answer.

The ideas which

were brought together as the administration's program were
more difficult than the previous programs to trace through
the hearings.

Hoover seemed reluctant to offer a detailed

farm relief program.

Secretary of Agric u l t u r e , Arthur M.

Hyde, was asked to testify as ah administration spokesman,
but he announced that he had to return to his home in
Missouri on personal business.

39

It appeared for awhile

that there would be no specific word from the White House
during the hearings.

In the early days of the proceedings,

Senators McNary, Caraway, and Norris each said that they had
no idea of what Hoover wanted in the farm relief bill and
asked his aid in preparing l e g i s l a t i o n . ^

Many newspaper

editors suspected that these agricultural-political leaders
might find it politically painful if they reported a bill
without the equalization fee unless they could tell their
constituents

that it was the President's plan.

41

The Norfolk

Daily N e w s , a typical paper from Nebraska, cynically remarked,
".

. . Congress finds farm relief an exceedingly hot potato

and would much prefer that it be the presidential fingers,
anybody's,

that get burned."

42

if

The political pressures

■zn
New York T i m e s , March 22 and 23, 1929.
^Senate,

Farm R e l i e f , pp.

2,4,

and 18.

41

See for instance; New York T i m e s , March 22 and 25 , 1929
Omaha World Herald, March 28, 1929; or Hastings Democrat,
April 11, 1929.
“

42

Norfolk

(Nebraska) Daily N e w s , March 30, 19 29.
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generated by H o o v e r ’s reluctance to announce a specific
proposal seemed to be the source of the ultimate split between
the Senate and the White House on farm relief.

If Hoover had

proposed a program similar to the one that was ultimately
passed, much of the difficulty of the Special Session might
have been avoided.
Despite Secretary H y d e ’s personal business, he was able
to return to Washington in time to testify before both c o m 
mittees.

Hyde asserted that his testimony was personal and

did not represent the views of anyone else.

43

The New York

Times reported, however, that everyone believed that the
Secretary was speaking for Hoover.
by reminding the committees

44

Secretary Hyde began

that the Republican platform

made three promises to the farmer:

tariff protection, r e 

duction of freight costs, and improvement of m a r k e t i n g . ^
His testimony recited the multitude of problems facing the
farmer.

The only solution, he suggested, was to create a

farm board with broad, general powers and very few specific
functions to carry-out.

It was to be as free as possible

to deal with any s i t u a t i o n . ^

The farm board was without

precedent and should be allowed to work out its own methods
through trial and error experience.

^Senate,

44

47

The secretary was

Farm R e l i e f , p. 489.

New York T i m e s , April 4, 19 29 .

^Senate,

46Ibid

..... •

Farm R e l i e f , p. 490.

. ,

Ibid. , pp. 626-627.
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either unprepared or unwilling to be more* specific about the
farm board.

He was closely questioned by several Senators,

but he refused to discuss any details.

48

Hyde did, however,

outline a marketing system wh ich was to be heavily financed
by the federal government.

49

Money was to flow from the

farm board to cnnperat.jves founded to stabilize specific crop
m a r k e t s . S e c r e t a r y H y d e ’s testimony seemed to be best
summed-up by the following statement:

’’The most I would offer

the farmer is ah instrumentality clothed with authority to
deal with his problems, an instrumentality composed of men
sympathetic wTith his problems.
The administration seemed intent on the creation of a
farm board with authority and money to organize and stabilize
the entire marketing system.

A great deal of the testimony

before the committees was given supporting or opposing
various parts of this program, but no one except Secretary
Hyde spoke directly for the administration.-

Both the Farm

Bureau and the National Grange had identified marketing
reorganization as an integral part of their programs, but it
was a secondary issue for both groups.

52

48

See for instance Senate, Farm R e l i e f , pp.
for Senator N o r r i s ’ questioning.
49Senate, Farm R e l i e f , p. 492.
50
Ilouse, H e a r i n g s , p. 625.
^Senate,

Farm R e l i e f , p. 497.

^ H o u s e , Hearings, pp.

13, 17-18, and 689.
'A

493-494,
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The members of the two committees

then heard the p r e 

sentation of two relatively simple programs of tariff reform,
a more complex plan of tariff changes, and a rather sketchy
program of marketing reform.

None of these ideas were entirely

new,and the committees seemed to show little enthusiasm for
any of the programs.

The consensus of opinion was that w h a t 

ever Hoover wanted was what would ultimately pass.

The

reluctance of the Senate Committee to report a bill without
specific guidelines from the President began to reopen old
wounds.

H o o v e r ’s apparent refusal to cooperate with the

committee was the major source of problems for those who
supported farm legislation.
After the public hearings closed,

the committees retired

into executive session to consider the testimony and write
their respective bills.

These proposals, which were to be

reported to Congress during the opening days of the imminent
Special Session, represented the sum of the forces and needs
which were at work during the hearings.

The two committees

emerged from executive session with different proposals.

The

Senate committee recommended the debenture program as an
addition to the plan suggested by Secretary Hyde.

The House

committee presented a program which was quickly characterized
as the admin ist rat ion’s plan.

CHAPTER III
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
THE ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM
On Monday, April 15, 1929, the Congress of the United
States met in special session.

It convened in response to

a proclamation issued by President Hoover which concluded
fl.

. legislation to effect further agricultural relief and

legislation for limited changes of the tariff can not in
justice to our farmers, our labor, our manufacturers be
postponed ... *

1

The Republican party had substantial

majorities in both houses of Congress which should have
guaranteed easy passage of the A d m inistratio n’s program.
However,

2

antagonism which had developed between Hoover and

some of the farm leaders had become apparent again during
the hearings.

This lack of harmony indicated that the farm

relief program might be contested after all.
session opened,

Even before the

the New York Times reported that the House

and Senate were likely to pass substantially different bills.
The resulting deadlock would require strong action by the

1
U.S. Congressiohal R e c o r d , 71st Congress, 1st session,
1929, L X X I , part 1, page 19.
Hereafter cited as Congressional
Record.
^New York T i m e s , April 7,. 1929.
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See also Appendix A.
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President to force Congress to arrive at a solution.
The
procedures of the House of Representatives, however, gave
little indication of the growing struggle which was centered
in the Senate.

The proposed bill that was introduced into

the lower house was popularly known as the Administration
Plan.

Its progress through the legislative procedures was

a study in w ell-organized, well-oiled, power politics.

The

Republican leadership was powerful enough to move the p r o 
gram through the House virtually without amendment and entirely
without discussion of any alternative programs.
The first order of business

in the House,

after its

organizational details, was to receive a message from
President Hoover.

William Tyler Page, the Clerk of the

House, read the message which opened with the reminder that
the Special Session had been called to consider,
relief and limited changes in the tariff

".

. . farm

. . . ,fT which

represented commitments made during the 1928 campaign.^

The

President then listed the causes of agricultural distress as
he saw them:

deflation, poor marketing systems,

costs, world competition, overproduction,
consumption.

increased

and decreased

’’The general result of these problems," he wrote,

"has been that our agricultural industry has not kept in pace
in prosperity or standards of living with other lines of
industry."^

Hoover emphasized that the Republican platform

3I b i d ., April 13, 1929.
4
Congressional' R e c o r d , p . 46 .
5lb i d .

X
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called for multiple solutions to the problem and that
the people had given a special mandate for action.

The

cornerstone of the adminis tra tio n’s program was to be a
federal farm board given enough money and latitude to
help the farmer in a variety of ways.

The members of the

board were to be free of politics so that they could
react in a logical manner to the economic forces which
plagued the farmer.

The farm board,

as Hoover explained

it, was to encourage agricultural research, guidance, and
development.

Its major function however, was to reorganize

the marketing system.

Already existing cooperatives

were to be used and expanded to form the basis of the
new marketing system.

Federal

funds were to be channeled

from the board to the cooperatives to help them stabilize
the marketing of farm commodities.^

The tone and c o n 

tent of the message should not have come as a surprise
to a n y o n e , as it followed the Republican platform
and the hesitant testimony of Secretary Hyde.
Public comment on the message was surprisingly limited.
Perhaps the most interesting was a statement released by
Charles E. Hearst, President of the Iowa Farm Bureau Fed era 
tion, and Milo Reno, President of the Iowa Farmers' Union,
which expressed disappointment over the President's comments.
Rend said, "If the position of Brookhart, Dickinson and some of

6 Ibid.

A

these other farm relief advocates who supported Hoover w e r e n ’t
so pathetic,
laugh

I would be inclined to give them a big hearty'

. . . .”

The statement confirmed the fact that the

split between the farm organization leaders and the farm
political leaders had not healed.
hand,

There was, on the other

some editorial support of Hoover and his program.

instance,

For

the Lincoln S t a r , from the representative farm

state of Nebraska, announced its approval of the President's
program at this time.

8

The editors of most Nebraska papers

ignored specific proposals until later in the session.
Gilbert Haugen, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture,
introduced House Resolution One on the first day of the
special session.

Its descriptive title was:

"A bill

(H.R.l)

to establish a Federal farm board to promote the effective
merchandising of agricultural commodities in interstate and
foreign commerce, and to place agriculture on a basis on
economic equality with other industries.”

The bill was

assigned to the Committee on Agriculture, which reported it
back to the House two days later with no amendments.
order to expedite the proceedings,

In

the entire bill was printed

in the Congressional Record on April 16.

10

7
New York T i m e s , April 17, 1929.
Reno was referring to
Senator Smith Brookhart and Representative L.J. Dickinson. Both
were Iowa Republicans who had supported H o o v e r ’s election.
^Lincoln

9

(Nebraska)

S t a r , April 16, 19 29.

Congressional R e c o r d , p. 27.

1 0 I b i d ., pp. 49-50.
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The opening section of House Resolution One stated that
the purpose of Congress was to place agriculture on an equal
basis with other industries by promoting effective marketing
practices.

This end was to be accomplished by protection,

stabilization, and control of the marketing of farm commodi
ties.

It was the intent of Congress to encourage and finance

marketing associations whic h would guide and direct the
stabilization efforts for each crop.

A federal farm board

was to be created to carry out the policy outlined in this
section.
Section Two of the resolution outlined the structure of
the farm board.

It was to have five members,

a chairman, and

the Secretary of Agriculture as an ex officio member.

The

members were to be appointed by the President, wit h the
approval of the Senate, for six year terms.

The chairman was

to be similarly appointed to serve at the pleasure of the
President.

This section instructed the board to establish

a main office in the Department of Agriculture in the
District of Columbia,

to hire any needed experts, and to do

all the necessary things to begin operations.
The next two sections established the duties of the board.
The first was to define the various commodity groups which
would be treated under this act.

The board was then instructed

to invite the existing cooperatives in each commodity group
to create an advisory committee to represent that crop before
the board.

The purpose of these advisory committees was to

provide expert council to the board on matters relating to
A

48
the marketing of their specific commodities.

The board was

also directed to carry out several minor functions which were
largely in the area of research, or education.
The fifth section of the bill provided for an appropria
tion of $500,000,000 to be used as a revolving fund.

Loans

were to be made with the interest paid to the federal treasury
while the principal was to return to the b o a r d ’s revolving
fund.

Four types of loans could be made:

loans to assist

’’effective merchandising” of farm commodities,

loans for

the construction or lease of physical marketing facilities,
loans for the formation of clearing houses, and loans to help
expand membership in c o o p e r a t i v e s . ^

The board was further

authorized under this section, to create an insurance system
which would prevent financial losses to marketing instruments
through declining prices.

Premiums were to be charged for

this service, but until the system began to function p r o f i t 
ably, costs were to be paid from the revolving fund.

No

action of the board could be undertaken if it was found to
increase the amount of crop surplus.
The sixth section provided for the creation of stabili
zation corporations to function as the marketing instrument
for each commodity group.

These were to be legally recognized

corporations which were wholly and exclusively owned by
cooperative associations.

11

The function of the stabilization

Ibid., p. 49.
There were limitations on construction
loans which restricted the size of the loan in relation to the
total value of the construction.
No construction was to take
place if it duplicated existing facilities.
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corporations was

to be. m a r k e t i n g .

Tkey were to buy from the

farmers at fixed prices and store the commodity until demand
raised the market price to an acceptable level.

The

stabilization corporation was central in the new marketing
system proposed by the Committee on Agriculture.

12

On April 17, the bill was assigned to the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for further consideration.

13

The next day, the first example of the power

and organization behind this version of the bill was revealed
when an unusual rule was adopted.

House Resolution Twenty-

one mapped out the entire life of the bill in the House of
Representatives.

The rule directed the Committee of the

Whole to meet immediately to consider the relief bill
exclusively.

Debate was to be controlled by the Chairman of

the Committee on Agriculture and the ranking minority member
of the Committee.

General discussion was to end at the

adjournment of the session on April 20.

The bill was then

to be read for amendment following the five^minute rule.
After the amending process,

the bill was to be reported to

the House and the previous question ordered immediately.

14

Representative Clarence Cannon of Missouri rose and
passionately argued against the rule.

He charged that the

12

Ib i d . , p. 50.
The last sections of the bill were
basically house -keeping in nature.
"^I b i d . , p . 75 .

^ Ibid. , p . 124 .
\
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proposal was designed to ” . . . jam this bill through the
House

. .

with no opportunity for debate or amendment.

Control of time was normally given to one person in favor
and one opposed to the bill, which was not the case under
this rule.

Anyone who opposed the bill or wanted to amend

it had to be granted time by a leader whu was favorable to
the bill in its present state.

Cannon concluded that this

was the first time in his twenty years of service that the
rights of a b i l l ’s opponents had been suspended.

15

C a n n o n ’s

remarks implied strong bipartisan support for the bill which
was,

in fact, revealed later.

Representative Edward Pou,

the highest ranking Democratic member of the Rules Committee,
answered C a n n o n ’s charges.

Pou said that ample time and

access were given for general debate.
regular rules,
amendment.

Furthermore, under

everyone had equal opportunity to offer any

The resolution was then agreed to by voice

vote.
Discussion of the measure in the Committee of the Whole
began immediately.

Chairman Haugen began by presenting the

report of the Committee on Agriculture.

The opening p a r a 

graphs of the statement obviously had been written in answer
to C o o l i d g e ’s veto of the McNary-Haugen measure.

The report

considered the e x - P r esident’s objections to the previous bill
as they related to the proposal before the House.

~^T b i d ., pp.

127-8.

1 6 I b i d ., p. 130.

The report
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began,

”We believe that this program, avoids the difficulties

on which past legislation has been wrecked.”

17

It further

stated that the bill was clearly Constitutional, offered no
subsidy, did not put government in business,

fixed no

prices, did not tax the farmer, created no bureaucracy,
was economically sound.

and

The report then summarized the

machinery created by the bill, emphasizing that it represented
the maximum amount of help that the government could give.

18

As a personal conclusion, Haugen said that the proposal
might not do everything everyone wanted, but it provided an
instrument with sufficient latitude and backing to solve the
problems,

if the farmers would work with the board.

19

Haugen asked unanimous consent to disperse with the first
reading, no one objected, and general consideration began.

20

The rhetoric which followed could hardly be considered
debate.
bill,

Although a few Representatives rose to criticize the

the next sessions of the House were filled by a parade

supporting the bill.

Some apparently liked the bill, but

many supported it only because there was nothing else practical
at that point.

Representative James Aswell of Louisiana

supported the bill and said, ” It is the best bill we can get

^ lb i d . , p. 12 7.
18 , .
Ibid.
1 9 I b i d ., p. 140.
20I b i d ., p. 131.

"\
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for agriculture.”

21

He seemed to imply that nothing else

would get H o o v e r ’s approval.

Edgar Howard of Nebraska made

the implication even stronger when he announced that he
supported the b i l l ,

. . because

T know

for which I can get a chance to vote."

it is the o n l y b i l l

22

Many of the reluctant

supporters were Democrats who also voiced an appeal for others
of their party to vote for the bill.

David Kincheloe of

Kentucky stated that although he was a Democrat, he would
follow the lead of the President in this matter.

23

Repre

sentative Aswell went further and asked his fellow Democrats
not to amend the bill.

He explained that this would make

the Republicans entirely responsible.

24

Thomas Williams of

Illinois voiced the idea that the matter was economic in
nature and not political.

Therefore, partisanship should

play no part in the decision.

He further reminded the House

that the proposal had been prepared by the entire Committee
on Agriculture and that parts of the bill had been written
by minority members of that committee.

25

Dispite the plea for universal support of the bill, some
Representatives voiced their desire

to include the debenture

or equalization fee plans in the bill.

21

I b i d .,

P*

129 .

2 2 ,
I b i d .,

P-

474.

2 3 T, • i
Ib id .,

P-

146.

2 4 T-i - 1
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2 5 Ti • ,
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Charles Adkins of
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Illinois and Chairman Haugen of Iowa both stated that they
would prefer including the equalization fee.
however,

Adkins,

said that he thought Congress should go ahead

without it, because,
this session .

26
.V

M I think it is out of the picture for
Haugen added, ” .

be no time for discussing any

. . this seems to

27
. . . [other] plan,. ,. .. .fC

The equalization fee and the debenture plan were both
proposed as amendments to House Resolution One.

The power

and organization of administration forces were clearly shown
by the method of handling each proposed amendment.

On April

24, Representative Cannon offered the equalization fee as
an amendment to the bill.

Fred Purnell of Indiana objected

on the grounds that the amendment was not germane to the
bill.

The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole simply

ruled in favor of the objection.

28

On April 25, Representative

Jones offered the debenture plan as an amendment.

Repre

sentative Williams objected, alleging that the new issue
was not g e r m a n e .
objection.

The Chairman once again sustained the

He explained that it was not enough for an

amendment to be on the same topic;
same idea to be germane.

29

it had to follow the

The nature of these decisions

26I b i d . , p. 146.
27I b l d ., p.

132.

2 8 I bid., pp. 480-1.
2^ I b i d ., pp.

564-566.
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by the Chairman clearly

underlined the support for the

gram as it had been introduced, and the power
supporters had at their
Those speakers who

pro

that the

disposal.
clearly supported the

bill emphasized

the need for immediate relief, the possible flexibility of
the farm board, and the limited nature of the bill.

Repre

sentative Kincheloe emphasized that the bill hoped only to
stabilize the marketing situation.

30

Scott Leavitt of

Montana added that the proposal was not designed to be a
universal aid to the farmer, but only specifically to help
reorganize marketing.

31

Chairman Haugen added in his

extended remarks that the aim was to control and stabilize
marketing.

The bill did not call for any specific method,

leaving the ultimate decision to the board.

32

Haugen had

remarked earlier that the board would be expected to make
the tariff effective by controlling surplus and promoting
orderly marketing.

33

L.J. Dickinson of Iowa emphasized

the importance of the board in the price stabilization
effort.34

Representative Aswell called the board the,

" . . . heart,
character,

soul,

[and] the life of the measure.

The

the integrity, and the vision of these six

men will definitely determine the success or failure of

30I b i d . , P-

140 .

31 Ibid. , P- 17 8.
32I b i d . , P-

136.

33I b i d ., P- 133.
34 I b i d . , P- 169.
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this plan.
Not all of the comments on the bill were favorable,
however.

There were expressions of dissatisfaction and

disappointment sprinkled throughout the discussion.

Repre

sentative Cannon was one of the most outspoken of the
opponents.

He said that the bill was a waste of time and,

"the greatest gold brick ever handed to the American farmer.
It fails every major test.
effective.

. .

It does not make the tariff

It does not control the surplus.

And it makes

7 fl

no provision against over production."

Representative

Jones argued that the board might be able to stabilize prices,
but what the farmer really needed was higher prices.

The

tariff had allowed other prices to increase, and some plan
to make the tariff effective on farm products was needed.

37

Elbert Brigham of Vermont argued that the bill could not
work.

He believed that ending crop surplus by cutting pro-

duction was the only long-range solution.

38

Many Represent a

tives had argued that, if nothing else, this bill was a
beginning which could be built on later.

Ralph Lozier of

Missouri disagreed and said that he feared that the act was
actually a, ".

. . step backward, a plunge into

. . . inaction."

He knew that the House would not pass any other bill, but

^ lb i d ., p . 129 .
36lb i d . , p. 128.
3 h b i d ., p. 157.
3 8 I b i d ., pp.

169-171.
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hoped that the Senate would force a better solution on the
39
lower H o u s e .
The power of the forces behind the bill were very
apparent as the bill was read for amendment in the Committee
of the Whole.
25.

The process began on April 23 and ended April

During the three day period numerous amendments were

proposed, but only three were accepted.

Two were editorial

and were approved by the Committee on Agriculture.
other was only a very minor change.

40

The

The bill was reported

out of the Committee and was recommended for final passage on
April 2 5.

41

The original rule governing the course of House R e s o l u 
tion One called for one motion to recommit the bill to c o m 
mittee.

This motion was made by Representative Cannon and

was defeated three hundred two to sixty-three.

The previous

question was then ordered, according to the Rule,
bill was passed.
366; nays,
teen.

42

and the

The House was divided as follows:

thirty-five; present,

yeas,

two; and not voting, nine-

Statistical analysis of the results indicated that

ninety-two per cent of the members voted either for or
against the measure.

Of those Representatives, ninety-one

39I b i d ., p. 415.
40I b i d ., pp.

542-3,

41i b i d ., p. 572.
42

I b i d ., pp. 572-573.
At that time there were four
vacancies in the House.
That left nine Representatives whose
position was not recorded at this time.

per cent voted in favor of passage, and only nine per cent
voted against.

This landslide victory of the proposal in

the House revealed how the managers of the, bill were able
to force

it through the process without any major contest.

Examination of

the vote by political parties

43

indicated

I

that although there was almost unanimous Republican support
for the measure,
as well.

there was substantial Democratic support

N'Tn e ty -two per cent of the Republican members voted

in favor of the measure
against.

while less than one per cent voted

On the Democratic side, seventy-three per cent

voted yes, and twenty per cent voted no.

Even more revealing

was the fact that only sixty-seven per cent of the yes
votes were Republican, but ninety four per cent of the no
votes were cast by Democrats.

Most of the Republicans who

did not vote for the bill also did not vote against it.
They voted present or did not vote.

The Democrats, on the

other hand, who did not vote with the majority, largely
voted against the bill.

44

Time announced that the "docile and well pledged" House
of Representatives had passed the P r esident’s bill.

"Fenced

off with barbed wire of special rules which Kept out all
amendments

including the debenture plan,

continued,

"was practically unchanged by eight days of

43

the measure," it

lb i d . A statistical analysis of the vote will be
found in Appendix A.
44

See Appendix A.
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debate .”

45

The ‘
O maha Bee -News, on the other hand , praised

the bipartisan support of the measure.

In an editorial,

the Nebraska paper believed that the House had acted for
the farmer instead of against the President.

46

* That comment

previewed much of the criticism which was to be leveled at
the Senate.

The range of editorial comment on the House

action was from indignant opposition to warm support.
The New York Times was perhaps warmest in its praise of
the bill.

Omission of the equalization fee and the debenture

program was the strongest part of the measure according to
the New York paper.

47

The Qm ah a B e e-N ews flatly stated that

it favored the adminis tra tio n’s proposal as passed by the
House.

48

The rest of the Nebraska editors were more hesitant

in their reaction to the House version.
the proposal did so reluctantly.

Those who did favor

The Kearney Hub supported

the bill as a foundation which could be built on later.

It

maintained that the bill was worthy of support even though
it did not do everything for everyone.
cluded,

The editorial c o n 

"A hungry man does not refuse half a loaf because he

is not offered a whole one.”
Much of press reaction,

49
however, was unfavorable to the

^ ’’National Affairs:
Husbandry:
T i m e , May 6, 19 29, pp. 13-14.
^ Omaha

(Nebraska)

Bee-News

Senators vs. H o over” ,

(Morning Ed.), March 17, 1929.

^ New York T i m e s , April 16 , 1929.
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Omaha Bee -N e w s , (Morning Edition), April 27, 1929.
^ Kearney

(Nebraska) H u b , May 11, 1929.

bill.

Several basic problems were cited:

new bureaucracy,

the creation of

competition with private enterprise, and the

l a c k .o f .tariff equalization,

The Omaha World-Herald p a r t i c u 

larly raised the last issue.

The editor pointed out that,

stable prices might not he high enough to aid the farmer.
The only way to insure a higher price

was to make the tariff

work for the farmer through the debenture program or eq uali
zation fee.

The only wa y to raise prices was to limit pro^-

duction,and the World-Herald bitterly opposed that alternative.
The idea that the activities of the farm board would compete
with private enterprise was emphasized by the national
coverage given to a statement issued by the Northwestern
Grain Dealers.

Their annual convention passed a resolution

which charged that the House version was unfair to their
interests.
grounds:

They opposed the administration proposal on two
first, cheap credit would be readily available to

the cooperatives, but not to grain dealers,

and second,

grain dealers would be taxed to help their c o m p e t i t o r s . ^
The Lincoln Star opposed the House version because of the
additional bureaucracy it created.

This would add to the

cost of government and not necessarily solve the problem.
The Star believed that marketing reorganization alone would

^ Omaha Worl d - H e r a l d , April 12 and 16, 1929.
the Lincoln S t a r , June 16, 1929. ,

See also

^~hsFew York T i m e s, April 18 , 1929 and. "National Affairs:
H u s b a n d r y : Houses Divided,"; T i m e , April 29, 1929, pp. 11-12.
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not aid the farmer.
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‘
In many ways the Beatrice News s u m 

marized the Nebraska press reaction to the House proposal.
Its passage was reluctantly greeted as an advancement.

At

the same time, the editor expressed great doubt if the bill
would do anything positive for the farmer.
concluded,

The editorial

"If the end of ten years sees the success of the

plan, Herbert Hoover will deserve more credit than we fear
he will ever receive.”

53

Dispite the cool reception its program received,
House had acted.

the

It had voted in a largely bipartisan manner

for a bill reported to have the blessing of the President.
Most importantly,
of strength.

it had acted with an overwhelming display

The possibility of passing any measure which

was substantially different from the one already acted upon
would have seemed remote indeed.

There were, however, forces

growing in the Senate which would pass a bill that was
drastically different and then would try to force the House
to accept the new m e a s u r e .

co
Lincoln (Nebraska)

S t a r , April 15 and 16, 1929.

^ B e a trie e (Nebraska) N e w s , May 2 , 1929.

CHAPTER IV
THE SENATE
THE DEBENTURE PLAN
On April 15, 1929, the Senate of the United States
convened in Special Session to consider farm relief legi s
lation.

The upper house met in response to the same call

which had summoned the House.

Forces were already in

operation which would make the Senate proceedings much
different from those of the House.

The political realities

of the situation made many Republican Senators believe that
they could support the P r e s i d e n t s program only if he were
to clearly ask for help.

The Senate Democrats were prepared

to oppose anything whic h was connected with Hoover.

The

managers of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s program simply did not have
the voting strength to force their measure through,
did in the House.

as they

The first order of business in the Senate,

as in the House, was to listen to the reading of the
P r e s i d e n t s message.

This was the last time the actions of

the two houses coincided until they both passed the A g r i c u l 
tural Marketing Act nearly eight weeks later.
The Senate Commi t lee on Agriculture did not present
their proposal on the first day of the session.
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In fact, the
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bill was not introduced until April 18, and the Committee did
not report it back to the Senate until April 23.
seemed to have had two causes.
important,

This lag

First, and probably least

the Committee had written a, hill

containing the

export debenture program, and there was a dispute about the
right of the Senate to introduce a measure effecting revenue.

3

The other reason for delay was the C o m m i t t e e ’s reluctance to
introduce their bill until the President had issued a statement about his program for farm relief.
As early

2

as April 11, a group of Senate leaders

had p r e 

sented the debenture plan to Hoover asking for his comments
and suggestions.

The President had agreed to review the plan

3

and to advise

the Senate Committee of his opinion.

next week the

Committee was inactive, waiting for the

P r e s i d e n t ’s reply.

For the

In the meantime, pressures were growing.

Nearly everyone interested in farm relief was anxious to get
a bill introduced and the legislative process started.

The

Committee decided, on April 11., to report the bill with a
provision allowing the farm board to use the debenture program
as one of their optional powers.

This decision was partially

based on the knowledge that this proposal would be made o-n
the floor if it were not included.

4

^New York

T i m e s ,April

18, 1929.

^New York

T i m e s ,April

16, 1929.

The Committee would have

^New York'
T'imes ,April 12 , 1929. The Senators who p r e 
sented the plan were McNary, Norbeck, Cooper, Heflin, and Ransdell.
^New York

T i m e s ,April

17, 1929.

^
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preferred to wait for H o o v e r ’s reply, but they decided that
they could wait no longer.
Charles McNary of Oregon, chairman of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture,
Its descriptive title was,

introduced the bill on April
"A bill

18,

(S. 1) to establish a

Federal farm board to aid in orderly marketing and in the
control and disposition of the surpluses of agricultural
commodities in interstate and foreign commerce."

It was

assigned to the Committee on Agriculture and Fores^fefya^/
The bill was nearly a carbon copy of the House version.

The

declaration of policy in the opening section emphasized that
the bill was to deal primarily with marketing.
of the bill was two-fold.

First,

caused by surpluses, and second,

The purpose

to end price fluctuations
to encourage a, "substantial

and permanent" betterment of the farm situation.^

The

details of the bill as developed in the next sections followed
the House's version closely, but differed slightly in minor
details.

The only major difference in the two bills appeared

in Section Ten of the Senate's version.
export debenture program.

It called for the

The plan was not mandatory but

could be used at the discretion of the farm board.

The

chairman needed only to notify the Secretary of the Treasury
to put the plan into effect.

The debentures were to be

U.S., Congressional R e c o r d , 71st Congress, 1st Session,
1929, L X X I , part 1, p. 102.
Hereafter cited as Congressional
Record.

®Ibid., p. 360.
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valued at one-half of the tariff rate on :any commodity,
they were to be used to pay duties on any imports.

7

and

This

small difference engendered nearly two months of political
fighting between the Senate on one side, and the House,
allied with the President, on the other.
The press reaction to the introduction of the Senate
bill was very sparse.

What comment there was

either

praised the proposal or charged that inclusion of the d eben 
ture program was a political maneuver.

The New York Times

reported that the debenture program had a good base, both
politically and logically.
tariff equalization,
that promise.

The Republicans had promised

and the Senate measure delivered on

The paper, however, held no hope for the

passage of the measure.

It said that the Republican

leadership had long since learned that it could ignore
g
farmers' demands.
The Hastings Daily Tribune supported the
Senate program.

The editor of the Nebraska farming community

paper argued that the proposed improvements in the marketing
would be welcome help to the farmer, but the problem was
larger in scope.

A substantial part of the problem was

world-wide in scope.

The debenture program would help solve

that aspect of the problem,

if Congress and the President

would approve it, but the paper held little hope that the
measure would pass.^

7I b i d . , p . 36 2.
^New York T i m e s , April 24, 19 29.
^Hastings

(Nebraska) T r i b u n e , April 27, 1929-.
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Criticism of the Senate proposal centered on the idea
that the debenture plan was simply introduced for political
motives.

The Kearney Daily Hub seemed to have been one of

the first papers to make those charges, although, before the
bill was passed, many papers were to join in the chorus.

As

early as April 20, the Nebraska paper charged that opposition
to the P r e s i d e n t s program was forming and was "deliberately
anti-Hoover" in nature.

10

They later charged that the

debenture proposal was not made in an attempt to aid the
farmer, but, ".

. . to create

endless discussion

. . .

an issue

. . . that offers

"

Introduction of the debenture program
forced the President to act.

On April

20,

seemed to have
Hoover issued a

statement which chastised those who would divide the
Republican ranks.
platform.

12

He called for unity under the party

On April 21, the President notified Senator

McNary that he would respond to the Senate the next day,
and would submit reports from the Secretaries of Agriculture,
Commerce, and the Treasury.

The position of the Admi n i s t r a 

tion was opposition to the debenture program.
report was released to Senator McNary,
strong condemnation of the program.

in

Kearney

(Nebraska)

te

When the

it proved to be a

Hoover stated,

Daily H u b , April 20, 1929.

n T M d . , April 22, 1929.
^ New York T i m e s , April 20, 19 29.

15ib i d ., April 21, 1929.
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. . I am convinced that it would bring* disaster to the
American f a r m e r . " ^

The President then summarized ten

weaknesses of the program.

Debentures, he argued, amounted

to a subsidy directly from the United States Treasury costing
over two hundred million dollars per y e a r .
of the debenture plan,

The first result

the report maintained, would be a

gigantic windfall profit to grain dealers and speculators
without aiding the farmers at all.

Grain owned by merchants

would immediately increase in price, and increased prices
could not filter to the farmer until the next harvest period.
Hoover further stated that when the benefit of the program
reached the farmer,

it would stimulate vast over-production

which would ultimately choke the program.

The President

feared that making export crops more profitable would slow
down the process of diversification of farming.

This, he

believed, was one of the best long-range solutions.

Hoover

argued that although the debenture plan was optional, the
farm board would be quickly pressured into using it.

The

President maintained that the subsidy was only indirectly
beneficial to the farmer.

If the farmer received any aid at

all, it would be reduced by the process of discounting the
debentures.

Furthermore,

foreign manufacturers could buy

their raw materials cheaper than competing American m a n u 
facturers.

In some cases this might have allowed foreign

competitors to ship goods to the domestic market cheaper than

14Ibid., April 2 1 , 1 9 2 9 .
\
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they could be produced in this country.
foreign livestock producers
than domestic stockmen.

* In the same vein,

could buy their feed cheaper

The relatively higher price of the

American commodities could have resulted in a loss of sales
in foreign markets.

The President noted that all countries

considered the export debenture system to be dumping,

and most

would certainly retaliate by raising their import d u t i e s .
Finally, Hoover argued that the export debenture program
would force a sizeable increase in domestic taxes.

The loss

in revenue from the debentures would have to be made-up
through internal taxation.

The President concluded that the

program ultimately would not benefit the farmer and would,
” , . . inevitably confuse and minimize the much more far
reaching plan of farm relief, upon the fundamental principles
of which there has been general agreement.”

15

The initial press reaction to the P r e s i d e n t ’s message
was largely positive.
arguments.

Most editors seemed convinced by his

The Kearney Daily Hub stated,

’’President Hoover

cuts the ground completely out from under the debenture plan.
He shows that it would be unscientific,
and self-defeating.”

costly,

oppressive,

The editor went on to praise the

President for acting at this time instead of waiting to veto
the proposal.

16

Many other Nebraska editors expressed strong

15

I b i d ., and Congressional R e c o r d , pp. 367-368.
Reports
from the Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture and the
Treasury are to be found in both sources as well.
■ ^ ’’The President is Rig ht, ” The National Repub lie as
quoted in the Kearney Daily H u b , April 30”, 1929 .
~
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opposition to the debenture program.

17

The only negative

comment came from the editor of the Grand Island Daily
Independent who noted that the P r e s i d e n t ’s message was a
contradiction of his earlier position.

The Independent

pointed-out that the President had promised not to dictate
to C o n g r e s s , but as soon as any action was taken which was
not included in the administration program, Hoover reacted
i 18
s tro ngly.
The P r e s i d e n t ’s negative reply to the committee put
considerable pressure on its members.

Should they report

the bill as it had been introduced, or should they delete
the debenture program?

Chairman McNary had been authorized,

by a previous vote, to report the bill without amendment.
He chose, however,

to submit the bill to the committee again.

The members were split on the issue of the debenture.

19

Eight

*

favored maintaining it, and six voted to strike it out.
vote on the entire bill was unanimously favorable,

The

so the

measure was reported out of committee without amendment,
and passage was recommended.

20

The committee submitted

^ S e e Norfolk (Nebraska) Daily N e w s , April 23, 1929, or
Wayne (Nebraska) H e r a l d , April 25, 1929.

18

Grand Island (Nebraska)

Daily Independent, June 13, 1929

1Q
New York T i m e s , April 21, 1929.
20

Congressional R e c o r d , p. 363.
There seems to be no
political or geographic rational for the split vote.
The
Republicans split four to four on the measure while the
Democrats carried it four to two.
The breakdown on either
side of the vote would indicate no geographic prejudice
in the outcome.

A
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a report to the Senate on the bill, which emphasized the need
for a multi-faceted approach to the farm problem.
stated,

” . . . no single measure will suffice.

21

..

It
22

The

report concluded that the bill was to strengthen the national
situation regarding surpluses and to bring effective, farmer
control of marketing.

23

The debate which followed was nearly always more heated
than discussion in the House had been.
appreciably more illuminating.

It was not, however,

Debate seemed to offer the

opportunity for various Senators to explain their positions.
No serious attempt to sway the opinions of other members
seemed to have been made.

In fact, two Senators mentioned

that the issues had already been decided.

Simon Fess of

Ohio said, ” 1 doubt very much whether any vote will be
changed by anything that is said “by any member on the floor.”
He concluded that a vote taken on that day and two weeks
from that day would be identical.
Alabama voiced a similar idea.
” . . . is already decreed.

It is cut and dried.

^ C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d , pp.
364.

I b i d ., P-

366 .

I b i d ., P- 731.
I b i d ., P-

722 .

J. Thomas Heflin of

He added that the result,

arrangements have all been m a d e . ”

I b i d ., P-

24

25

364-36 7

The
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The highlight of the first day of debate was a speech
made by T.H.

Caraway of Arkansas.

The Senator took the

opportunity to reply to H o o v e r ’s message about the debenture
plan.

Carraway took an angry, blustery tack which had strong,

humorous overtones.
accept

At one point he remarked,

, , , [ H o o v e r ’s] reasoning he does not need information

to have faith."

26

In his discussion of the supporting d o c u 

ment written by Secretary of Agric u l t u r e , Hyde,
said,

"If anyone can

".

. .if

Carraway

the Senators will read the statement

before the committee,

. . .

they will acquit him of having any

information on the subject."

27

The Senator did, however,

ably defend the debenture program.

He expressed an idea that

was not often heard during that period, either in Congress
or out.

He suggested that the best solution might be to

end the tariff program and put all segments of the economy
on their own.

28

He argued that as long as the tariff was in

effect, a program of tariff equalization was needed.

The

Senator personally favored the equalization fee, but was
willing to accept the debenture plan because it was faster.

29

He charged that the Administration's program was a political
bill to solve a political problem,

and that without the

debenture program, the whole thing was worthless.

26I bid ., p.

371.

2 7I b i d ., p . 37 2.
28 Ib id ., p . 372.
29 I b i d ., p.

375.

3 0 I bid., p.

374.
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Many Republican Senators criticized Hoover and his h a n d 
ling of the entire farm, relief situation.

Joseph Robinson of

Arkansas theorized that if the President had acted more
promptly,
duced.

the debenture feature might never have been in tro

He pointed out that the idea was included only after

a prolonged wait for H o o v e r ’s opinion.

31

Smith Brookhart of

Iowa was one of the Senators who had been effected the most
by the P r e s i d e n t ’s stand on the debentures.
campaigned strongly for Hoover,

Brookhart had

and had assured the farmer

that the Republican candidate stood for real farm relief.
The Senator clearly felt betrayed.

’’I had a distinct u n d e r 

standing,” he said, ”of what farm relief meant.
in the best of faith I know how to exercise.
32

Herbert Hoover ....

The Senator promised,

be a hereafter about all this.”

33

I went out

I believed in
’’There will

Other Senators from

farming regions joined Brookhart in his protest.

They had

all supported Hoover and believed that they had received
nothing for their t r o u b l e . ^

The only Midwestern Republican

who was not affected by the P r e s i d e n t ’s position on farm relief
was Senator Norris who had openly opposed H o o v e r ’s election.
The Senator accused the President of allowing farmers to
believe,

during the campaign,

51I b i d ., p.

that his administration would

1241

32I b i d ., p. 735.
3 3 I b l d . , p. 436.

34
737.

See for instance, Congressional Record, pp. 523-525 and
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advocate a strong farm relief m e a s u r e , then, after the
election,

supporting a weak m e a s u r e . ^

The Senate Democrats were also critical of H o o v e r ’s
stand.

Pat Harrison of Mississippi echoed N o r r i s ’ speech very

accurately and added that the pressure from the administration
was mounting.

36

Senator Robinson expanded the idea of A d m i n i 

strative pressure and revealed that some Senators had been
threatened with changes in the tariff schedules if they
supported the debenture program.

37

The New York Times reported

that some Senators who supported the debenture plan had been
ignored by the President in his consideration of patronage
appointments.

The paper reported that Senator W. B. Pine,

a Republican from Oklahoma, had submitted a suggestion for
a position in the Indian Bureau which had been overlooked,
following the S e n a t o r ’s vote for the debenture plan.
Those Senators who supported the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s
program of market reorganization explained their positions
in several w a y s .

Senator McNary made a curious statement:

’’This bill is of an emergent character.

It is designed to

meet a present situation and might be called a short-time
approach to the probl em. ”

He stated that this was not the

time to evolve a long-range program.

38

The S e n a t o r ’s

3S
Congressional R e c o r d , pp. .733-734.
36I b i d . , pp.

1251-2.

3 7 I bid., pp.

1249-51.

38Ibid., p. 368.
'A
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position seems contrary to the actual workings of the
President's program.

He was later questioned about his

support of the administration's proposal.
bluntly,

McNary answered

"I stated very plainly that sometimes you must

forego your own views in order to get legislation."

39

The

rest of the ideas expressed in the debate in support of the
administration's proposal were identical to those expressed
long before the Senate session began.

There were a few

amendments to the bill, but they were mainly minor in
nature.

All-in-all,

the Senate seemed to be a forum for b e 

ginning a Senator's next campaign.

Especially if that

Senator was from a farm state.
The press reaction to the Senate's activity was almost
universally negative.

There were only three Nebraska papers

that supported the debenture aspect of the proposal,
support was somewhat

tenuous.

readily divided into

two categories:

political motives,

and

The general reaction could be
criticism of the

and criticism of the debenture plan itself.

Most papers took the former position, but many considered the
debenture plan to be most important.

Most of the editorials

followed Hoover's criticisms very closely.
without giving credit,
for his position.

They cited,

often

the reasons the President gave Congress

Some papers went a bit further.

Bee-News called the plan "fatuous

The Omaha

. . . paternalism."^

The

39I b i d ., p. 599.
Omaha

(Nebraska) Bee-News

(Morning-Edition), May 9., 1929.
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Lincoln State Journal commented that the debenture program
was,

"a plan of farm relief for which there exists no demand

among the farmers and which offers no substantial relief-to
agriculture, and what is more, stands no chance of being put
into effect!11^

Those papers that supported the plan

universally emphasized the f.airness of the debenture system.
If tariff support was important and justifiable for one
segment of the economy,

then it should be made to work for

the rest of the economy as well.

The Grand Island Daily

Independent stated that case and speculated that opposition
to the debenture was based on opposition to rising food
costs.^

The Hastings Daily Tribune editorially asked,

if

subsidy is wrong for wheat, why is it not wrong for e v e r y 
thing e l s e ? " ^
The charge that support of the debenture plan was
politically motivated, received a great deal of editorial
space.

Nearly every paper repeated the accusation at one

time or another.

Senators Brookhart and Borah were often

singled out for specific criticism.

The Lincoln State

Journal suggested that Senator Brookhart should begin to
think before he made a speech,

and further suggested that

a critical evaluation process would leave the Senator with

^ ( L i n c o l n , Nebraska) Evening State J o u r n a l , May 13, 1929
Hereafter cited as State J o u r n a l .
^ Grand Island Daily Indep end ent , May 20, 1929.

^ Hastings Daily Tribune, May 11, 19 29.
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little to say.

44

The Democrats who supported the debentures

received their share of criticism.

Most papers charged that

their position was dictated entirely by p o l i t i c s . ^

The

Lincoln State Journal was bitterly critical of the Democratic
proponents of the debenture plan.

It argued that the program

was completely antithetical to party policy, yet many Senators
supported it anyway.

The paper concluded,

M . . . party l e a d 

ership has fallen so low that it has nothing of its own to
offer and it is content wit h the crumbs that fall from the
tables of the insurgent Republicans,"
press reaction,

46

The over-whelming

then, was against the S e n a t e fs attempt to

include the debenture proposal in the farm relief program.
The first real test of the relative strength of the
various groups came when James Watson of Indiana proposed
an amendment to strike the debenture plan.

47

The amendment

was narrowly defeated forty-seven to forty-four.

48

Analysis

of the voting revealed that the Republican Senators voted
three-to-one to strike the debenture section.

Nearly ninety

per cent of the Democrats, on the other hand, voted to keep
the section in the bill.

44

The strength of the Republican

Lincoln S t a r , June 12, 1929.

^ S e e Kearney Daily Hub, May 7, 19 29, or Omaha Bee-News
May 9, 19 29.
:
46
47

State J o u r n a l , May 13, 1929.
Congressional R e c o r d , p. 730.

48Ibid., pp. 997-998.
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party was clearly behind' the President.

The debenture feature

was saved by the block vote of the Democrats

combined with

a few insurgent Republican Senators.
The next major obstacle for the Senate version of the
farm relief program was the vote on final passage.

The Senators

concluded their debate and voted on the measure on May 14.
The bill, was approved easily,

fifty-six to t h i r t y - n i n e . ^

The majority of the Republican party still voted against the
measure,

and ninety-four per cent of the "no” votes were cast

by Republicans.

The Democratic block once again solidly

supported the measure.

Eighty-five per cent of the Democratic

Senators voted for the bill, and a majority of the "yes" votes
were cast by Democrats.

51

One of the peculiar things about

these two votes in the Senate was that the whole bill passed
by a larger margin than the debenture feature.
Senators,

Nine

eight Republicans and a Democrat, voted against

the debenture feature, but for the whole bill.

The Grand

Island Daily Independent noted that they were all from farm
states.

52

These Senators must have believed that opposition

to the debenture plan was not as important as getting some
farm relief passed.

49
50
51
52

It was quite clear the S e n a t e ’s version

See Appendix B.
Congressional R e c o r d , p.

1296.

See Appendix B.

Grand Island Daily Indepen den t, May 16,
Appendix B.

192 9, and

was passed by the solid support of the Democratic wing.

The

insurgent Republicans got most of the attention in the press,
but the Democrats saved the program.
The Senate,

then, had finally completed its version of

the farm relief program.

The process took nearly three weeks

longer than it had in the House.
the two houses were marked.

The differences between

The strong leadership of the

House was not apparent in the Senate.
the Senate

Neither group

in

seemed to have any organization or even any

general plan of attack.
Republican program.

The House measure was clearly a

The S e n a t e ’s version was carried by

solid Democratic support.
The opponents had clearly identified themselves:

the

Senate majority on one side, with a coalition of the House
and the Administration on the other.

The battle ground b e 

came the Conference C o m m i t t e e ’s room and the national press.
The process of resolving the differences between the two
versions of the bill would take another month.

The clash

of political power that was exercised during the Conference
period was to force the bill into its final form.

Chapter 5
THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
POWER POLITICS
The Conference Committee, which was appointed to
resolve the differences between the two versions of the
farm relief bill, proved to be the center of the last
battle of the Special Session.
however,

The political maneuvering,

took place in both Houses of Congress,

national press,

in the

in the offices of the President,

in the committee sessions themselves.

as well as

The political aspects

of farm relief came to the front more obviously than they
had at any other stage of the legislative p r o c e s s .

All

the skill and power of the managers of the President's
program were ultimately called upon to carry the farm relief
program to completion.
The House of Representatives had completed its version
of the bill several days before the Senate.

The lower

house had passed the Administration's version, but the
Senate had added the debenture program.
the only major difference,

Although this was

it was not certain,

at that

point, whether or not the conflict could be- resolved.
The plan of action of the House leadership was not

\
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clear in the early stages of the final struggle.

The New

York Times reported that a strong division existed among the
House Democrats on the debenture plan.'*'

A sizeable number

of Representatives favored not considering the Senate version
of the bill,

thereby refusing to approve a conference.

2

The

reason for this position was the argument that the debenture
feature effected the income of the United States and should,
therefore, be considered a revenue measure, which could only
3
be originated in the House.
The New York Times reported
that if the House chose to make an issue of the Const itu
tionality of the S e n a t e ’s action and refused to accept their
bill,

the whole farm relief effort might die.

The paper

speculated that a method of circumventing the deadlock
would be found to save some part of the entire program.

4

There were four apparent courses open to the House leaders.
They could have moved for unanimous consent for a conference,
which would have been refused.

They might have referred the

Senate bill to the House Committee on Agriculture for action,
which was not likely.

They could have proposed a special

rule that would gloss over the Constitutional issue.

Or,

they could have flatly refused to accept the Senate version

^New York T i m e s , May 15, 1929.
^I b i d ., May 16, 1929.
^’’National Affairs:
May 20, 1929, pp. 9-10.

Husbandry:

III W i nds,”

^New York T i m e s , May 16, 19 29.
A

Time,
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of the measure.

The New York T i m e s ,believed that the third

alternative was the most likely.*’

The next day,

reported that the House managers would,

indeed,

the Times
ask for a

special rule which would bypass the Constitutional issue and
send the measure to conference.

Pressure from the ad ministra

tion was considered to be the reason for attempting to ignore
the Constitutional question.^
On May 17, Bertrand Snell of New York, Chairman of the
House Rules Committee, rose and presented a resolution

which

was the course of action .decided upon by the leadership of
the House.

The resolution stated that there was a Cons t itu

tional question involved with the Senate's version of the
bill, but existing circumstances were such that the House
would ignore the question and consider the S e n a t e ’s proposal.
This action, however, was not to be considered a precedent
in any other situation, present or future.

The resolution

proposed the House accept the Senate's version, but not
accept the Senate's amendment,
asked for by the upper house.

7

and agree to the conference
Representative Snell was the

principal speaker in favor of the resolution.

He reported

that he personally believed that the Senate's proposal was
unconstitutional.

This remark was greeted by applause from

5 It>i d •

6 I b i d ., May 17, 19 29.

7

U.S., Congressional R e c o r d , 71st Congress, 1st Session,
19 29 , L X X I , pi 1448.
Hereafter- cited as Congressional R e c o r d .
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;
the other members of the House.

81

He continued by reporting

that others of "equal ability" believed the opposite.

The

question could have easily provoked argument which might have
required many months or even years to resolve.

Snell c o n 

cluded that the proposed rule should be adopted and work
continued.

8

Time reported that Snell later explained that

a Constitutional argument would not have been understood by
the people who wanted farm relief at once, and that a
compromise was necessary.

9

!
j

Arguments against the resolution centered on one idea:
the rule gave the members of the House no chance to vote
j
on the debenture plan separately from the rest of the p r o p o 
sal.

Eward Pou, of North Carolina, {ranking minority member
(
of the Rules Committee, was first to oppose the measure.
He
called it a "steamroller" action which would not be easily

!
accepted by the general public who did not give the House
■
i
any credit for courage anyway.
He asked that the debenture
plan be brought to a specific v o t e .^
Clarence Cannon of
1
i
Missouri called the resolution a, "gag rule of the most
arbitrary character

. . . ."

1X

r

He cjharged that this was
j

one more example of the power politics which had been used

^Ibid.
q
"National Affairs:
1929, pp. 12-13.
10

?
Husbandry:
j

'
Congressional R e c o r d , p. 1448.

1 1 I bid., p. 1450.

Sick Giant," T i m e , May 27,
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since the beginning of the session.

12

Representative Jones of Texas presented a convincing
argument concerning the Constitutional question.

He m a i n 

tained that the debenture plan was not a revenue measure
within the definition of the Supreme Court.

The court had

ruled that for the Constitutional prohibition to be in
effect,

the measure had to deal primarily with raising funds.

Since the debenture program was essentially a farm relief
measure,

the Senate could, quite properly, propose it.

13

The resolution was brought to a vote and passed by a
two-to-one margin.

14

The Speaker of the House appointed the

following Representatives to act as conferees:

Gilbert

Haugen of Iowa, Fred Purnell of Indiana, Thomas Williams of
Illinois, James Aswell of Louisiana,

and David Kincheloe of '

K e n t u c k y .^
The President of the Senate had previously appointed
the following to the committee:

Charles McNary of Oregon,

George Norris of Nebraska, Arthur Capper of Kansas, Ellison
Smith of South Carolina, and Joseph Ransdell of L o u i s i a n a . ^

12I b i d ., p.

1451.

■ ^ I bid., p. 1112.
The New York Times editorially concurred with this opinion, arguing that the actual effect of
the debenture was the expenditure of funds and not actually
raising money.
New York T i m e s , May 16, 1929.
14

Congressional R e c o r d , p. 1454.
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These ten Congressmen were charged with the duty of ironingout the differences between the two versions
relief proposal.

of the farm

Time reported that farm relief had,

"dis

appeared into the subterranean chambers of the capitol

. . ."

and stated that the failure of the debenture plan seemed
certain.

Three of the five Senate conferees and all five

from the House had opposed the program.

17

In short,

the

administration forces had packed the Committee.
Comment from the press concerning the Congressional
activity still seemed to be against the S e n a t e ’s stand on the
debenture issue.

The Omaha Bee-News called for the House to

stand-up and repudiate the Senate action.

18

The Wayne Herald

was hopeful that the two houses could agree on something
that would not hurt the farmer even if it did not help him.

19

The Kearney Daily Hub predicted that the debenture proposal
would fail, or that no measure would be passed at all.

20

The New York Times speculated that the House expected the
Senate to give-up on the debenture program, and if the
Senate refused, all farm relief efforts would fail.

It also

predicted that the Senate would use a specific defeat of the
debenture proposal by the House as a good excuse to abandon

17

"National Affairs:
Husbandry:
Sick Giant," T i m e ,
May 27, 1929, pp. 12-13.
1o
Omaha B e e - N e w s , (Morning Edition), May 17, 1929.
~^Wayne

(Nebraska) H e r a l d , April 25, 1929.

^ Kearney

(Nebraska) Daily H u b , May 10, 1929.
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that part of their program.

In that way; the Senate could

insure farm relief legislation and still save face.

21

The Conference Committee met for the first time on
May 21.

The differences were quickly isolated.

Conferees

The House

insisted that the committee consider the debenture

issue first.

The members from the Senate refused to consider

a compromise on the debenture section until the House had
taken a roll call vote on the proposal.

The conferees from

the House asked for time to consult their leaders and report
back.

22

They reported the next day that there was no change

in their previous position.

23

The leaders of the House were

simply unwilling to allow the Senate to dictate procedures
to t h e m . ^

The Committee continued to meet daily until

May 26, when the Representatives walked-out of the meeting.
They stated that there was no reason to continue, and that
the debenture issue was the entire cause of the problem.
The New York Times speculated that this break-down would
allow Congress to recess and escape from Washington for the
summer m o n t h s . ^
The demand for some kind of farm relief legislation
proved to be too strong to allow a recess, however.

Pressure

^ New York T i m e s , May 17, and 20, 1929.
22

pp.

Ibid., May 21, 1929.
2 55607.
2 5 I b i d ., May 22, 1929.
2^ I b i d . , May 26, 1929.

See also, Congressional R e c o r d ,

had been exerted on all sides to get work under way again.
An action of the Florida legislature was often cited as
representative of the general mood of the country.

The

legislature passed a resolution which instructed its Senators
to get on with farm relief and abandon the debenture proposal
The imminent arrival of summer was also cited as a factor in
getting the conference underway again.

27

President Hoover

expressed his opposition to taking a recess until the farm
relief bill was passed.

28

The following day, Congressional

leaders announced that they would not allow the summer recess
to begin until the farm question was settled.

29

The Conference resumed on June 2 and compromises were
reached on all contested issues except the debenture program.
The deadlock continued as before.

On June 6, the committee

finally reached an agreement which abandoned the debenture
section of the bill.

The vote was eight to two with only

Senators Norris and Smith dessenting.

31

Senator McNary

explained that the majority of the Senate's Conferees had
agreed to drop the debenture section because they believed

26I b i d ., June 1, 1929.
27I b i d .
2 ® I b i d . , May 30, 1929.
29I b i d ., June 1, 1929.
30I b i d ., June 2, 1929.
3 1 I bid., June 6, 1929.
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that their action would not harm the debenture proposal if
the Senate wanted to insist upon it.

Their decision could

also have hastened the course of legislation if the Senate
were willing to abandon the provision.

McNary concluded that

the Representatives on the Committee were completely unwill
ing to accept the debenture program or recommend a roll call
vote on the issue.

32

The Conference Report was presented to the House of
Representatives on June 7.

A statement was issued by the

Conferees from the House which explained the changes and
recommended that the compromises be accepted.

The report

stressed that the bill was primarily the original House Bill
with a few minor changes.

33

The question of agreeing to the

Conference Report was called and the Report was accepted.

34

The Conference Report was presented to the Senate on
June 6.

35

Discussion of the report centered on the refusal

of the House to vote directly on the debenture section.
Claude Swanson of Virginia

stated that the Senators who

supported the debentures had the right to force each Representative to make his position known to the public.

32

Congressional R e c o r d , pp.

33I b i d ., pp. 2520-2523.
3 4 I b i d ., p. 2531.
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36

Senator Norris believed that the Representatives could c a m 
paign safely now regardless of their actual feelings on the
debenture

issue.

He stated that if the House refused to

accept the debenture provision, he would vote for the bill
without it.

37

The question of agreeing to the Conference

Report was called,

and the Report was refused.

The vote was

forty-three to forty-six with six Senators not voting.

38

The Senate further resolved to insist on its original version
and to ask for a further conference.

The same five Senators

were appointed as conferees.
The New York Times reported that the farm program
"in the balance."

hung,

The only hope for passing legislation

acceptable to the President was for the House to vote directly
on the debenture question.

40

The Times charged that the

Senate*s action was politically motivated,

and that the

campaigns of 1930 and 1932 had already begun.

41

The R e p u b 

lican leadership was made aware of a growing anti-Republican
trend by a special election which had been held in Kentucky.
In November,

the Republican candidate had won the election

by over four thousand votes.

In May,

the Democratic candidate

had won by more than one thousand votes.

3 7 I b i d ., p. 2562.
3 8 I b i d ., p. 2661.
3 9 Ibid.
40

Ne w York T i m e s , June 10, 1929.

One of the reasons
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cited for the change was growing disaffection caused by the
delays in the farm relief program.

42

After the defeat of the first Conference Report,
President Hoover assumed the leadership in the fight for farm
relief legislation.

His first action was to release a strong

statement to the press.

He praised the version passed by the

House as a long-range method of improving the farm situation.
Hoover stressed that no one had adequately refuted his a r g u 
ments against the debenture program.

The President concluded

that the Senate had at best delayed action and at worst had
killed all hope for farm r e l i e f . ^
H o o v e r ’s second action was to have a conference with
Congressional leaders.

The Senators present were:

McNary

of Oregon, James Watson of Indiana, David Reed of P e n n 
sylvania, Walter Edge of New Jersey,
New Hampshire.

and George Moses of

Speaker Nicholas Longworth of Ohio, R e pre

sentative John Tilson of Connecticut and Representative
Bertrand Snell of New York were invited from the House of
Representatives.

Hoover was aided by Secretary of A g r i c u l 

ture Hyde, Secretary of War Good, and the P r e s i d e n t ’s
secretary, Walter H. Newton.

Exactly what was said during

that ninety minute conference was not revealed to the press.

Ibid., June '5, 1929.
Another special election was
held in Minnesota slightly later.
The results showed the
same trend as Kentucky had exhibited, only stronger.
Lincoln (Nebraska) S t a r , June 21, 1929.
4 3 I b i d . , June 12, 1929.
\

It was apparent that the President was trying to find some
way to get the farm relief legislation through Congress.

44

Time reported that Hoover exerted his authority as party
chief and President.

He- virtually ordered the leaders of

the House to bring the debenture measure to a v o t e . ^

A New

York Times editorial had remarked that H o o v e r ’s prestige
had been wounded by the Senate's action.

The President had

clearly announced his opposition to the debenture, but his
advice had been ignored.

The paper concluded that the House

had to act quickly to rescue the P r e s i d e n t ’s image and
possibly to save all of H o o v e r ’s legislative program.
The House indeed acted quickly.

46

The next morning,

Representative Haugen moved that the House insist on its
version of the bill and agree to a new conference.

John

Tilson of Connecticut offered an amendment which would,

if

a p p r o v e d , ,instruct the conferees from the House to demand
the omission of the debenture program.

47

The New York Times

reported that this procedure was agreed upon to meet the
S e n a t e ’s demand for a direct, roll call vote on the debenture
program.

48

Representative Tilson said that his motion was

45
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designed to end the controversy over the debenture plan and
that i t ■provided,

” . . . the most direct way and perhaps the

only way that we can get this bill pa sse d.”
was accepted,
thirteen.

50

49

The amendment

two hundred and fifty to one hundred and
Statistical analysis of this vote indicated a

reasonably strict division by political party.

Sixty per

cent of those who actually voted on the measure were R e p u b 
licans,

indicating their majority position.

Eighty-seven

per cent of the ”y e s ” votes were cast by Republicans,

and

eighty-eight per cent of the "no" votes were recorded by
Democrats.

Eighty-one per cent of the Republican Repr ese nta

tives voted to remove the debenture plan, while sixty-one
per cent of their Democratic counterparts voted to keep that
portion of the p r o g r a m . T h e

administration's control over

the House was clearly demonstrated.

The Republican majority

once again carried the President's program.

The House c o n 

cluded its consideration of the matter by appointing the
same conferees who had served before.

52

The New York Times called the vote a "notable” victory
for President Hoover.

The editors reported that the only

reason that the House had resisted so long was to keep some
Mid-western Republicans from having to vote against the

49

Congressional R e c o r d , p.

2788.
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Ibid.
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debenture program.

53

The '
Omah'a Wo rid -He r a 1d commented that

the House had uncritically accepted the Presi d e n t ’s suggestions.
The Representatives had refused to consider improvements, but
followed directions instead.

"That makes the kind of a

legislative body," the Worid-Heraid concluded,
can easily learn to love.”

54

"any executive

The press generally took the

position that the House had been blocking the legislative
process by refusing to vote on the debenture issue and expressed
the hope that the Senate would move quickly on the farm relief
. 55
proposal.
The conference began the following morning, June 14.
It was unanimously agreed to resubmit the same report which
had been presented b e f o r e . T h e

Conference Report was filed

with the House as the first order of b u s i n e s s .

Representative

Haugen simply asked that the report be accepted,
by voice vote.

57

and it was,

Senator McNary introduced the Conference

Report to the upper house and asked that it be considered at
the end of that day.

His request was also accepted.

a minimum amount of debate,

58

After

the question of agreeing to the

^ N ew York T i m e s , June 14, 1929.
Omaha Morning W orld-Heraid, June 14, 1929.
*^See for instance, Grand Island (Nebraska) Daily I n d e 
pendent , June 10 or 14, 1929 , or Kea'fney Daily Hub~^ June 14, 1929.
^ Congressional R e c o r d , p. 2781.
I b i d ., p .

2894.

5 8 I b i d ., p. 2870.
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report was moved.
eight.

59

The report was accepted seventy-four to

Statistical analysis of the vote indicated that

the Republican majority had carried the bill.

The D e m o 

cratic Senators cast only one-third of the "yes"'votes,
did record, however,

They

sixty-three per cent of the "no" votes.

Nearly sixty per cent, of the total votes actually cast for
or against the measure were recorded by Republican Senators.
Curiously enough, the Report received more nearly universal
support within the Democratic party than within the R e p u b 
lican.

The numerical superiority of the Republicans allowed

them to claim the bill as a Republican m e a s u r e . ^

This vote

was a distinct contrast to the earlier returns on the S e n a t e ’s
version of the bill.

That measure had been largely carried

by a solid block of Democratic Senators.

The substantial

Republican support of the Committee Report,

coupled with a

slight Democratic shift against the successful version,
gave the S e n a t e ’s action a definitely Republican f l a v o r . ^
The immediate reaction to the passage of the bill was
contradictory.

The McCook Tribune praised the House for not

wavering from the Republican platform, and for its support
of the President.

62

The Grand Island Daily Independent

attacked the House with equal enthusiasm.

It charged that’

I b i d ., p. 2886.
^ S e e Appendix D.

61

See Appendixes B and D.

^McCook

(Nebraska) T r i b u n e , June 21, 1929.
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the Representatives had played politics *first and placed the
relief question second.

63

The Hastings Daily Tribune stated

that the recent actions of Congress might be an argument
favoring a unicameral legislature.

64

Dispite the wide v a r i a 

tion of reactions, most papers agreed that the actions of
Congress had to be considered a definite victory for President
Hoover.^

Apparently his leadership in the latter stages of

the process had saved his prestige.

Tfine, however, believed

the P r e s i d e n t ’s victory had been a difficult one.

Hoover had

been forced to give up the idea that the Executive should not
interfere with Congress.
definitely interfered,

In fact,

the President had,

’’very

[and] very distinctly dictated.

Immediately after the Conference Report was approved by
both houses,

the measure was signed by the Speaker of the

House and the Vice President of the United States.

67

The

Committee on Enrolled Bills sent the measure to the President
that same day, June 1 4 . ^

The next day, Hoover held a

signing ceremony and made his approval official.

The P r e s i 

dent greeted many Congressional leaders for the event which

^ Grand Island
^ Hastings

(Nebraska)

Daily In dep endent, June 12, 1929.

(Nebraska) Daily T r i b u n e , June 14, 1929.

^ McCook T r i b u n e , June 21, 1929, or Omaha Morning W o r i d Herald, June 21, 19 29.
f\f\

-

’’National Affairs:
The Presidency;
Start,” T i m e , June 24, 1929, p. 11.
f\

7

Congressional R e c o r d , pp.

6 8 I b i d ., p.

2977.

Constructive

2886 and 2935.

was attended by many reporters and extensively recorded by
press photographers.

69

The President signed his first name

with one pen and his last name with another.

He then

presented the pens to Senator McNary and Representative
Haugen.

70

Hoover delivered a short speech which concluded:

’’After many years of contention we have at last made a
constructive start at agricultural relief with the most
important measure ever passed by Congress in aid of a single
71
in dustry.
The national reaction to the passage of the farm relief
measure seemed, on the balance,
Arthur Capper of Kansas,

to be favorable.

Senator

in an article written for the New

York T i m e s , reported that the legislation was a vital
measure for the farmer.

”It is intended to be for agr icul 

ture,” the Senator wrote,

”what the Federal Reserve Act is

for commerce, what the transportation act is for the r a i l 
roads,

[and] what the protective tariff is for manufacturing

and labor.”

72

S. H. Thompson, President of the Farm Bureau

Federation, hailed the bill as the beginning of a ’’new era
in farming,” and stated that the bill would bring prosperity

69

Senator Watson was reported to have remarked that a
photographer was the only person in the world who could
keep four Senators quiet for three minutes.
New York T i m e s ,
June 16, 1929.
70

New York Times, June 16,

7 2 I b i d ., June 18,

1929.

1929.
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to the farmer once again.

73

The National Grange was the only

organization that expressed disappointment over the exclusion
of the debenture plan.

A news release from the Grange stated

that the bill as enacted was not strong enough, and that the
debenture idea would be heard of again.
The local reaction was mixed.

74

The Lincoln Star pointed

out that on the same day that Hoover signed the bill,
price of wheat on the grain exchange fell.
the decline,

the

The reason for

the paper reported, was a drought-breaking rain

in the Canadian wheat-growing region.

The paper concluded

that the grain dealer had much more faith in rain than the
government as a factor in wheat prices.

75

The North Platte

Tribune offered a typical criticism when it suggested that
the program was a long-range solution and that the farmer
was in immediate need of aid.

76

The Wayne Herald suggested

that the measure would provide only psychological help in
the short-run.

The long-run impact of the program was. com-

pi etely unknown, the Herald concluded.

77

Much

stressed the sincere effort on the part of

of

the comment

the Administration

and emphasized that the program should be considered an

73I b i d ., June 16, 1929.
74

Kearney Daily H u b , June 24, 1929.

^ Lincoln S t a r , June 17, 1929.
^ The North Platte
^ Wayne

(Nebraska)

T r i b u n e , July 12, 19 29.

(Nebraska) H e r a l d , June 20,.1929.
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experiment to be changed or discarded as experience dictated.
The over-all reaction was regarded as cautiously optimistic.
An editorial in the Grand Island Daily Independent, based on
an informal survey of Nebraska newspapers, expressed the
general feeling.

It reported that generally the press

supported popular acceptance of the new legislation and calle
for a fair trial period before final conclusions were reached
The Grand Island paper w a s , ..however,. quite skeptical about
the potential success of the bill.
the skepticism, but hoped,

79

The Lincoln Sun shared

"that Mr. H o o v e r fs program s u c 

ceeds beyond expectations."^^
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 was a reality.
The Federal government had responded to an apparent need.
Its action had been shaped and dictated by the pressure
groups interested in the solution.

The groups with great

political power influenced the outcome greatly.

Those

groups “with'lesser power had less influence on the outcome.
This kind of problem-solving apparatus, when faced with a
complex problem with multiple potential solutions, was
always subject to question.

Did the solution resolve the

problem?

78

See, for example, Hastings Daily T r i b u n e , June 13,
1929, and Evening State Journal ( L i n c o l n , M e b r a s k a ) , June
25, 1929.
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Grand Island Daily Inde pen dent , June 22, 1929.

^^Lincoln Star, June 17, 1929.

Chapter 6
CONCLUSION:

ECONOMICS OR POLITICS

The final judgement regarding the potential usefulness
of the Agricultural Marketing Act in solving the farm problem
was difficult to reach.
consensus.

There was no real contemporary

The history of the Farm Board proved that it did

not work, but the unusual economic conditions of the early
thirties might have prevented a system from working at that
time which could have succeeded under more stable conditions.
It would seem, therefore,
fairly tested.

that the potential had not been

The final decision could be reached only

after a process of analysis of the economics of agriculture,
with particular emphasis on the farm problem of the Twenties.
A concept of what was needed could then be developed,
compared with the Agricultural Marketing Act.
of the differences between the hypothetical,
and the actual legislation could be made.

and

An analysis
ideal solution

Finally,

sug

gestions could be offered to account for the differences.
The agricultural industry was in a peculiar economic
position.

First,

the farmer sold in a market over which he

ha d absolutely no control.
adjust his production.

Second, he had little ability to

Third, he sold a product for which

97

\

98
the total demand was inelastic.

The demand for farm commodi1
ties was most significantly related to population.
The
total demand for food was relatively unresponsive to either
price changes or rising c o n s u m e r ’s income.

It has been

estimated that for every one per cent increase in income,
the demand for farm commodities only increased one tenth of
one per cent.

In fact,

as income increased.

the demand for certain foods decreased
While consumer expenditures

for food

increased as income rose,

the major portion of the increase
3
went to pay for packaging and convenience services.
The
farmer,

then, operated in a situation in which general

prosperity was transmitted to him only in limited amounts.
Even without other agricultural problems,

the increasing w e l l 

being of the United States during the Twenties could have
aided the farmer only in greatly diminished portions.

Agri

culture simply could not accrue benefits which other segments
of the economy enjoyed.
The individual producer had only limited ability to
adjust his total production.

The proportion of his fixed

costs to variable costs was so high that he was forced to
produce the maximum amount, regardless of projected demand.
Although the farmer had some variable costs,

1

the bulk of

Earl 0. Heady, A Primer- on Food, A g r i c u l t u r e , and
Public Policy (New York!
Random House, 1967), p\ 97
Hereafter cited as Heady, Agriculture and Public P o l i c y .
^ I b i d ., pp. 9-10.
^I b i d ., p . 10.
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his annual expenditures were fixed long in advance by a
4
series of mortgage and loan agre e m e n t s .

In this situation,

the annual income of the typical producer varied a great deal
more than his annual costs. **

The only factors which really

affected production were non-economic,
trollable:

weather,

insects,

and largely u n c o n 

and disease.^

This dependence

on uncontrollable factors virtually guaranteed great price
and income instability.

7

In addition,

the farmer was forced

to continue to make large capital expenditures in order to
compete with his neighbors.

If he failed to increase his

production as his competitor-neighbors had, he would be
forced to meet falling prices with a relatively smaller
g
amount of his crop for sale.
The only way for the individual
producer to help himself was to increase his productivity.
When this factor was applied on a national scale, the total
production increased, and prices fell even more.

The

farmer was caught in a nearly impossible situation.

In

order to maintain his competitive position, he was forced
to make large expenditures to be amortized over a long period

4
~
Adlowe L. Larson, Agricultural M a r k e t i n g , (New York:
Pre nt ice-Hall, Inc., 1 9 5 1 J , p p . 22-23.
Hereafter cited as
Larson, M a r k e t i n g .
^Heady, Agriculture and Public P o l i c y , p.

26.

^Larson, M a r k e t i n g , p. 22.
7
Heady, Agriculture and Public P o l i c y , p. 25.

8 Ibid., p. 56-57.
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of time.

The resulting high, fixed costs forced the farmer

to produce the maximum amount each year.

The ever-increasing

supply continually depressed the market prices,
entire industry in worse condition each year.

leaving the

9

The individual p r o d u c e r ’s relationship to the commodity
market placed him in a difficult position.

The market was

one of the last examples of pure capitalism.

No individual

farmer produced enough to have any impact on the market.
He was forced into the position of "pri ce-t ake r," who could
sell all or nothing at one,
gross income was equal

stated p r i c e . T h e

f a r m e r ’s

to the price received, multiplied by

the quantity sold, minus the marketing costs.

Without

interference from outside of the market, the price was not
adjustable, but was inversely proportional to the total
quantity sold.

The quantity sold was, to some degree,

adjustable, but other forces dictated that the maximum
possible quantity would be produced.
total amount sold increased,

Furthermore,

as the

the price fell, offsetting

any potential increase in the f a r m e r ’s gross income.
cost of marketing was, perhaps,

The

subject to adjustment, but

only through large-scale a c t i v i t y . T h e

agricultural

industry was caught in another situation which was largely
beyond the control of the individual farmer.

^ I b i d ., p p . 26-28.
^^ I b i d ., p . 24.

11

Larson, Marketing, pp. 42-44.
A
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massive cooperative activity could the farmer effect his
gross income.

Even then,

was small at best,

the potential increase in income

and total income would still be subject

to large fluctuations.
There were additional forces in operation during the
Twenties which mutiplied these general agricultural d i f f i 
culties.
ion.

The basic problem of the period was over-p rod uct

It was caused by improved farming techniques,

demand,

shifting

and the artificial stimulation of production during

World War I.

The result of the surplus had been drastically

lower prices.

The problem was worsened by the continually

rising costs of production and living.

12

Statistics indicated

that during the period from before the war to the early
Twenties,

farmer's taxes had increased 126 per cent, farm

mortgage debt had increased 132 per cent, freight rates had
risen steadily,

and farm wages had increased 115 per cent.

Wholesale prices of non-agricultural products had increased
by seventy-two per cent from their pre-war level.
same time,

At the

the dollar value of all farm products had increased

by only twenty-two per cent.

13

The increased commercialization

Murray Reed Benedict, Farm Policies of the U . S.:
17901950 (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 195 3), p p . 236-237,
hereafter cited as Benedict, P olicies, and George Frederick
Warren and F. A. Pearson, The Agricultural S i t u a t i o n ,
Economics of Fluctuating Prices (New York:
J~. Wiley and S o n s ,
I n c . , 19 24), pp^ 19-21 and p. T, hereafter cited as Warren
and Pearson, Fluctuating P r i c e s .

13

Warren and Pearson,

Fluctuating Prices, p. 1.

\
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of farming, accompanied by increasing dependency on outside
goods, made the farmer even more at the mercy of rising
c o s t s .^

The farmer seemed to be suffering from-his e n t h u 

siastic response to the unusual demand created by World War
I.

He bought land and equipment to meet the demand.

the economy readjusted to normal following the war,

When
the

farmer was left with the capacity to produce at the emergency
level,

and the economic necessity to use that capacity.

In order to develop a concept of what might have been
done for the farmer in 1929,
types of policies available.

it was necessary to examine the
Agricultural economist Earl 0. .

Heady wrote that there were three general types:
tional, developmental,

and regulatory.

15

compensa-

The latter were

designed to protect the health and welfare of the consumer,
and did not seem applicable to the situation of the Twenties.
The Congress of the United States had instituted d e v e l o p 
mental programs from its beginning.

The earliest stages of

the developmental policy featured cheap land, and the
Homestead Act was the evolutionary result.

As the public

land was used-up, Congress shifted emphasis and began to
support an agricultural policy which featured research and
education p r o g r a m s . ^

14I b i d ., pp.
15
16

Then, as agriculture began to shift

26-27.

H e a d y , Agriculture and Public P o l i c y , p . 48.

I b i d . Such programs as the Land Grant Colleges, the
creation of the Department of Agriculture, the Hatch Act, the
Smith-Lever Act, and the Smith-Hughes Act were cited by Heady
as examples of this p h a s e .
^

from labor-intensive toward capital-intensive,

the policy

began to provide credit designed especially for agricultural
needs.

17

These developmental policies were so successful that

early in the Twenties the new problem of surpluses was created.
From that point on, any further efforts of a developmental
nature benefited only the.cons ume r, not the farmer.

18

The

first responses to over-production were attempts at selfhelp.

These largely failed because of the scope of the

problem.

The demand for governmental assistance grew, and

the idea of a compensational policy evolved.

19

The aims of

this new policy were to offset the effects of the devel op
mental policy,
prices.

20

and to pay the farmer compensation for low

The result of this new emphasis was to treat the

effects of the problem without attempting to solve them.
Compensation did not impose any permanent readjustment in
the agricultural sector of the economy.
any permanent solution had to, ".

21

Heady/argued that

. . require or encourage

a shift in the farm resource mix to a richer proportion of
capital,

a greater reliance on management,

a numerically

smaller labor force, and larger and fewer farms.”

17

These

I b i d . Programs like the Farm Loan Act, the Federal
Land Bank System, and the Federal Intermediate Credit banks
were cited as examples of this phase.
18I b i d . , pp.

56-57.

1 9 Ib id., pp.

58-59.

^9Ibid., pp. 59-60.
Ibid.
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changes were necessary to allow agriculture to take advantage
of economies of scale,
farmers remaining.

22

and return adequate rewards to those
Another agricultural economist pointed-

out that the least productive one-third of the American farms
produced only four per cent of the total output.

23

relatively high proportion of low-production farms

The
would

indicate that H e a d y ’s analysis was probably correct.
The ideal solution would have been one which would have
sought a permanent,

long-range end to the farm problem;

a

solution which could have ultimately resulted in a selfsufficient, healthy industry.

This far-reaching program

could logically have been accompanied by a short-run c o m 
pensation program which would have aided the industry during
the transitional period.

Professor John D. Black of Harvard

University outlined this concept before the House and
Senate Committees on Agriculture.

He testified that

production was out of proportion to population and that a
long-range adjustment of production had to be undertaken.
/

Black proposed a program of tariff adjustment schemes as a
means of easing the problem, while long-range solutions were
24
evolved and put into effect.
The P r o f e s s o r ’s analysis of
the situation and proposals would seem to have been the

22 I b i d ., p. 41.
23
Larson, M a r k e t i n g , p. 26.
^ S e e Chapter II for a more detailed discussion of Dr.
B l a c k ’s testimony.
A
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soundest presented to the Committees.
The Agricultural Marketing Act was clearly a compensation
program.

25

There was nothing in the bill which would force

or encourage any adjustment of production to current demand.
It must have been considered,

therefore, a temporary solution,

one which would be effective until a more permanent program
was evolved.

Even as a short-range solution,

the validity

of the new program must have been questioned.

The lack of

any provision to control production was a serious defect.
It insured that any slight price rise would be greeted by
increases in supply.

Growing surpluses would guarantee that

the five hundred million dollars would be too small a sum to
stabilize the markets and raise prices.
sources voiced this opinion.

26

Few contemporary

One exception was the Lincoln

Star which was very critical of the new program.

It stated

that the problem was not marketing, but surplus.

The editor

argued that the best marketing system could not digest two
hundred million bushels of surplus wheat per year and still
raise prices.

The Star concluded that if any program was to

be valuable in the long-run,
The sane,

"It must deal with the surplus.
27
simple and economic way is to avoid creating it.”

The drastic changes in the non-agricultural segments of
the American economy in late-1929 insured the failure of the

25

Heady, Agriculture and Public P o l i c y , p. 59.

26 T, . ,
Ibid.

^ Lincoln (Nebraska)

Star, July 1, 1929 .
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Agricultural Marketing Act.

The Farm Board had been created

to function modestly in normal times, and not as a tool for
emergency use.

When the total economic climate got worse,

the experiment was doomed.

28

As it became apparent that the

Federal Farm Board was failing,
Funds were exhausted,
on May 26, 1933,

it was rejected by the public.

and the board became inactive.

Finally,

the Agricultural Marketing Act was repealed.

Its failure, however,

29

should not be attributed entirely to

the non-agricultural situation.

Farmers produced record-

breaking crops during the active period of the Farm Board.
The expense of buying and storing the surpluses actually
exhausted the financial capacity of the program.

30

The over^alT

economic situation probably only hastened an inevitable result.
If the Agricultural Marketing Act could not solve the
farm problem and had little chance of easing the interim*
period, why was it passed?

The final form of this piece of

legislation was determined by at least four factors:

the

nature of the democratic p r o c e s s , conflicting interests,
tradition,

and a general over-simplification of the problem.

The combination of these factors in this situation produced
the weak solution.
The farm problem was over-simplified by nearly every

7P

Benedict, Polic i e s , p.

^ I b i d ., p.
30

257. -

264.

"Farm States Rage at the Farm Board,"
July 18, 1931, pp. 8-9.

Literary Digest,
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interested group.

It was most often narrowly defined as a

problem of price or income level,
other aspect.

31

to the exclusion of any

The root of the problem,

overproduction,

was seldom mentioned in Congress or the press.
discussed,

it was often viewed as a temporary,

type of problem.

32

When it was
adjustment

In f a c t , many people rejected the idea

of surplus control as foolish, dangerous,

or unconstitutional.

Refusal to accept surplus production as a major factor of the
problem and surplus control as a potential solution, may
have been caused by two things.

First,

the ability to p r o 

duce consistant annual surpluses was quite new and might
reasonably have been misunderstood.

Prior to the Twenties,

surpluses were temporary and could be absorbed within a few
years.

The fact that the imbalance of production was not

cyclical was not widely recognized.
a chronic surplus problem,

Secondly,

if there were

there must also be a surplus of

farmers and farm capacity as well.

To recognize the former,

dictated the recognition of the latter.

The exodus of

farmers to the city was already considered critical.

34

To

have suggested that this flow should have increased would

31 See for instance, U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Agriculture, Hearings on Agricultural R e l i e f , 71st Congress,
1st Session, 1929, p. 238.
32

See,

for instance,

See, for instance,
House H e a r i n g s , p. 690.
^See,
News-Press

Senate,

H e a r i n g s ,p . 21.

Senate,

H e a r i n g s ,pp.

21, 33, 532,

or

for instance, Senate,
H e a r i n g s ,p. 532, or Nebraska
( Nebraska City, Nebr a s k a ) , May 30, 1929.
A
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have been heresy.

Oversimplification of the problem,

for

whatever reason, caused attention to be focused on the symptom,
low prices,

instead of the cause, surplus production.

The second major obstacle in creating a strong solution
to the farm problem was tradition.

The role of tradition in

any democratic problem-solving situation cannot be overstated.
The beliefs, prejudices,

and expectations of everyone c o n 

cerned with the problem dictated the form of the final solution.

35

Tradition moulded thinking about the farm problem in

many different ways.

One of the most basic ideas in nearly

e v e r y o n e ’s thinking was that the life of the rural citizen
was somehow better than that of his urban co unt er-part.
life was to be protected at any cost.

Rural

Professor Edwin R. A.

Seligman expressed this idea most succinctly:

’’The farmer

must not only be preserved from approaching the status of
the European peasant, but he must maintain his position as
7 fi

the fountain head of American ener gy. ”

This prejudice also

prevented serious consideration of proposals which would have
utilized production limitations or would have increased the
migration to the cities.

35

For an excellent discussion of this topic see:
Glynn
McBride, "Foundation and Purpose of Public Policy in A g r i c u l 
tural Mark ets,” Agricultural Market Analysis, Development,
Performance, P r o c e s s , ed. Vernon L. Sorenson (East Lansing,
M i c h i g a n : Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, 1964), pp. 26S-274 .
7/:
^
See footnote 69 in Chapter II.
This same theme was
followed in an editorial in the Norfolk (Nebraska) Daily
N e w s , April 16, 1929.
A '
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Another area where tradition affected thinking about the
farm problem was the tariff policy.

Benefits derived by the

farmer from the tariff were tenuous at best.

They were based

on the argument that prosperity was b r o u g h t ,to the industrial
sector of the economy by the tariff.

This brought general

prosperity to the United States and* thereby,

to the farmer.

The farmer was harmed to the extent that he bought products
at a higher price than would have prevailed without the tariff.
Economic experts could not agree whether the tariff was
financially beneficial or harmful to the farmer.

One expert

concluded that the problem was so intangible that it was
impossible to assess.

37

Most farmers seem to have believed

that the tariff was harmful to their personal i n t e r e s t s . ^
At the same time, many farmers supported the tariff as a
guarantee of general prosperity.

39

This situation caused a

great deal of attention to be focused on tariff equalization
schemes which were of questionable,

short-range benefit and

did nothing to solve the long-range problem.

40

Tradition further hampered the problem-solving process

37
York:

Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Economics of Farm Relief
Columbia University Press, 1929), pp. 209-210.

(New

38

See, for instance, Kearney (Nebraska)Daily H u b , April 29,
1929, or Hastings (Nebraska) Daily T r i b u n e , May 11, 1929.
39

See, for instance, The Lincoln (Nebraska) S t a r , May 11,
19 29, or the Hastings Daily T r i b u n e , May 1.1 , 19 29.
^ F o r an excellent discussion of the tariff as it applied
to the farmer, see the testimony of Dudley Roe of Maryland.
H o u s e , H e a r i n g s , pp. 352-364.
\

1 10

by limiting the solution to the common conception of the role
of government.

Nothing could be done which seemed to break

the ideal of non-interference with the economic system or
private matters.

The issues of paternalism and over-extension

of government powers were raised many times.

41

The idea of

production limitations was particularly attacked as being
outside of traditional boundaries.

Senator J. Thomas Heflin

of Alabama
even stated that acreage controls were unconstitu42
tional.
Tradition, then, excluded from consideration in 1929 ,
many ideas which ultimately formed the basis of legislation.
*

The over-all impact was to force the problem-solvers to choose
solutions from within certain acceptable limits which were
determined by social considerations.

Any idea outside of

tradition had no chance of being transformed into legislation.
The third major factor which determined the form of the
Agricultural Marketing Act was the conflict of interests
involved in the problem-solving process.

There were conflicts

within the agricultural industry as well as between various
farming interests and other segments of the economy.

The fact

that a successful solution to the farmers' problems would have
raised the price of his product caused conflicts wit h outside
interests.

An increase in the cost of food or raw materials

was not going to be widely accepted outside of the agricultural

41

See, for instance, Oma h a Be e -New s , May 9, 19 29.

^Senate,

Hearings,

p . 33 .

Ill'
segment of the economy.

43

The obviously depressed state of

agriculture with the-accompanying loss of purchasing power
lessened the impact of any great rebellion against farm
relief.

Any measure which would make the American farmer

into a consumer would have been happily accepted in many
44
areas.
Conflicts within the agricultural industry were probably
more damaging, because
have been presented.

they split the united front which could
Many farmers were commercial consumers

of agricultural commodities.

For instance,

feeder bought grain from other farmers.

the livestock

Any part of the farm

relief program which aided the grain farmer raised the costs
of the stockman.

45

This kind of problem was common within

the industry and undoubtedly made the passage of useful
legislation more difficult.

It certainly made the passage

of any one-dimensional program nearly impossible.

The

general result of conflict of interests was to make the
course of legislation more complex.

Conflicts between

43

This feeling was strongly expressed on the Nebraska
editorial pages.
See, for instance, Hastings Daily T r i b u n e ,
April 2 7,. 1929, or Nebraska News- P r e s s , (Nebraska City,
Nebraska) March 2 0, 1929.
44

See, for instance, Senate, H e a r i n g s , p. 532.
The
ambivalent position which some industries were in, was.
illustrated by the testimony of Robert Amory, who r e p r e 
sented three cotton manufacturers in Massachusetts. House,
H e a r i n g s , pp. 521-5 33.
_
45

The same type of conflict arose around all types of
livestock feed.
See, Norfolk Daily N e w s , March 25, 1929.
"Y
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agriculture and other segements of the economy created a u t o 
matic opposition to any program.

Conflicts within the

industry diluted the impact of the farm vote and engendered
feelings ranging from indifference to hostility.
The final factor which shaped the form of the Agricultural
Marketing Act was the nature of the democratic process.

The

problem-solving apparatus tended to be dominated by a large
number of limited-interest groups.

A solution could only be

enacted when enough of these groups to form a majority could
agree on one solution.

The multiplicity of groups and the

diversity of their interests tended to force legislation to
be the simplest and least effective possible measure.

Common

ground had to be found which a majority of these interest
groups could accept.

This forced the groups who were most

directly interested in the solution to propose legislation
which was hopefully strong enough to solve the problem, yet
weak enough to invite enough support to insure its passage.
Once the common ground had been delineated by the legislative
processes,the bill was quickly passed.
In conclusion,

the Agricultural Marketing Act could not

have been considered an attempt to solve the long-range farm
problems.

It made no mandatory adjustments which could

ultimately solve the problem.
value as a short-range,
seriously questioned.

At the same time, its potential

transitional

solution must have been

The ability of the Federal Farm Board

to raise prices, or stabilize them, must have been considered

\

limited at best.

It was suggested that the weakness of this

act resulted from a combination of factors which were almost
completely outside of the control of the farmers.

A solution

which might ultimately have solved the farm problem could
have only been evolved at a time when all of these factors
aligned themselves perfectly.
in 1929 was.not that t i m e .

The Special Session of Congress

APPENDIX A
Statistical analysis of vote on House Resolution 1
All responses by political party.

Ye s

Total

Rep.

Deni.

366

246

35

33

-

119

Present

2

2
2

Not Accounted For

9

3

6

19

14

5

267

163

No

Not Voting
Vacant

Farm
labor

1

4
4 35

Total

1

Distribution of responses w ithin the whole Hou se and
within each political party by percentage

All
Members

Rep.

Dem.

Farm
labor

84.0

92.0

73.0

100

No

8.0

0.8

20 .1

Not Voting

4.4

5.2

3.0

Voting Present

0.5

0.8
1.1

3.7

100.0

100.0

Yes

Not Accounted for
Vacant
Total

2.1
1.0
100.0

100.0

*U.S. Congress, Congressional R e c o r d , 71st Congress, 1st.
Session, 1929, L X X I , part 1, pp. 572-573, and U.S. Congress,
Congressional Directory, 71st Congress, 1st. Session, 1929,
pp. 137-144.
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Distribution of vote by political party within
each response by percentage.

Dem.

Farm
Labor

Total

67

33

0 ,3

100 .3

6

94

74

26

R_ep^
Yes
No
Not Voting

_

100
100
100
100

100

Present
Not Accounted for

33

67

Relative size of all groups actually voting for
or against the measure by percentage.

Yes
No
Total

Rep.

Dem.

Farm
Labor

61.4

29.7

0.2

0.5

8.2

61.9

37 .9

Total
91.3
8.7

0.2

100.0

APPENDIX B
Statistical analysis of vote to strike the debenture
proposal from S. 1, and vote on whole S. 1.*
All responses by political party of vote to strike
debenture proposal from S. 1.

Rep.

Dem.

Farm
Labor

Total

Yes

42

...... 2

44

No

13

34

47

Paired

1

..... 3....

4

...... 1

Not Voting
Total

1

56

1

39

*

96

Distribution of responses within the Senate and
within each political party on vote to strike
debenture proposal from S. 1 by percentage.

Ye s
No

....

Not Voting
Not Accounted for
Total

Senate

Rep.

46

75

5

49

23

87

4

Dem.

-

1

2....
100

100

Farm
Labor

8

100

100

100

*U.S. Congress, Congressional R e c o r d , 71st Congress, 1st
Session, 1929, L X X I , part 1, pp. 997-998 and 1269.
U.S.
Congress, Congressiona1 D i r e c t o r y , 71st Congress, 1st
Session, 1929, pp. 135-136.
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Distribution of political party membership within each
reaction on vote to strike debenture proposal
from S. 1. by percentage.
---- --------------------1
1
1
1

. Yes

Rep.
95
28

No
Not Voting

Farm
Labor

Dem.
..... 5

'

72

.

75

Not Accounted for

25

TOO

Total

100
100
100
100

Relative size of groups actually v oting yes or no
on motion to strike the debenture proposal

&
CD
V

from S. 1 by percentage.

46

Yes

Dem.

Farm
Labor

Total

..... 2

48

•*-

No

14

37

51

Total

60

39

99

All responses by political party of
vote on S. 1.
Farm
Labor

Rep.

Dem.

Yes

21

33

54

No

31

2

33

Paired

3

4

Not recorded

1

8
1

Total

56

39

1
1

Total

96
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Distribution of responses within the Senate and within
each political party on vote on S. 1 by percentage.

Senate

Rep.

56

Yes
>•

No
Not Voting
Not Recorded
Total

.

.

.

.... D e m .

37

85

55

5

8
1

6
..... 2

99

100

10
0
100

3

4

-

■

Farm
Labor

100
100

Distribution of political party membership within each
reaction on vote on S. 1 by percentage.

Rep.

Dem.

Yes

39

61

No

94

6

Not Voting
Not Recorded

..... 37 '

50

Farm
Labor

13

100

Total

100
100
100
100

Relative size of groups actually voting yes or no
cin S. 1 by percentage.

F arm
Labor

Rep.

Dem.

Yes

24

38

62

No

36

2

38

Total

60

40

100

Total

APPENDIX C
Statistical analysis of final vote on Conference Report
in the Senate and the vote to strike the
debenture section in the House.*
All responses by political party of final vote on
Conference Report in the Senate.

Dem.

Rep.
47

Yes

74

5

8

3

Not Voting

5

7

1

Q

56

39

Total

Total

27

No
Not Recorded

Farm
Labor

1

13

1
1

96

Distribution of responses within the Senate and within
each political party by percentage on final vote
on Conference Report in the Senate.

Rep.

Dem.

Farm
Labor

84

69

100

No

5

13

8

Not Voting

9

18

14

100

1
100

Yes

Not Recorded
Total

2
100

100

Total
77

*U.S. Congress, Congress ional R e c o r d , 71st Congress, 1st
Session, 1929, L X X I , p. 2886 and pp. 2788-2789, and U.S.
Congress, Congress ional D irec t o r y , 71st Congress, 1st
Session, 1929, pp. 135-144.
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Distribution of vote by political phrty within each
response by percentage on final vote on the
Conference Report in the Senate.

Yes
No

......

Not Voting
Not Recorded

Rep.

Dem.

64

36

37

63

38

54 '

Farm
Labor

8

100

Total

100
10 0
100
100

Relative size of all groups actually voting for or against

CD

the Conference Report in the Senate by percentage.

&
Yes
No
Total

Farm
Labo r

Dem.

Total

57

33

90

4

6

61

39

10
100

All responses, by political party, on vote to strike
the debenture section from House Bill.*

'

Total

Rep.

Yes

250

217

No

113

13

Present
Not Voting
Not Recorded
Vacant
Total

Dem.
33 i

..... 1

100
1

64

35

28

3

2

1

268

16 3

...... 2

Farm
Labor

1

....... 3
4 35

1

*There is a discrepancy in the Congressional Record on this vote.
In the text, the "not voting" total was reported as sixty-five.
However, only sixty-four names were listed in that category.
This table, and those following, were prepared assuming that
sixty-four was the correct figure.
'A
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Distribution of responses within the House and each
political party on the final vote to strike the
debenture section from the House Bill
by percentage.

All

Rep.

Dem.

Yes

57 ' .... 81

20

No

26

5

61

0.5

0 .4

0.6

15

13

17

Not Recorded

0.7

0.7

0.6

Vacant

0.7

Total

100

100

100

Present
Not Voting

Farm
Labor

100

100

Distribution of vote by political party within each
response on the final vote to strike the
debenture section from the House
Bill by percentage.

Yes

Rep.

Dem.

87

13

12

No

Farm
Labor

88

Present

50

50

Not Voting

55

44

Not Recorded

67

33

1.6

Total

100
100
100
100
100

Relative size of all groups actually voting for or against
striking the debenture section from the
House Bill by percentage.

Rep.
Yes
No
Total

Dem.

Farm
Labor

Total

60

9

69

3

28

31

63

37

„....: J

100
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